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WHEN THE ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTEREST
BECOMES A NUISANCE
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INTRODUCTION
That the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter the "Code" or
"U.C.C."), at least as originally conceived,
' was an extraordinary ac-
complishment, perhaps the most successful 
endeavor of its kind, is
beyond cavil.2 But the crowning achievement was 
saved for the last-
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t Floyd and Martha Norris Chair and Professor 
of Law, University of Oklahoma
College of Law.
1 Originally published in the early 1950s, the 
Uniform Commercial Code has
been periodically updated, including, over the 
past fifteen years, the substantial revi-
sion of virtually every article of the Code. Some 
commentators have questioned
whether these revisions have eroded the Code's 
initial refinement, simplicity, and bal-
ance. (Put another way, whether the Code has become 
less inspirational and more
prescriptive.) For further discussion of this difference in 
drafting style, see Lawrence
Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First 
Principles in the Reform of the
Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist 
Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 173, 204-06 (2000).
2 Professors White and Summers refer to the 
U.C.C. project as "[tlhe most spec-
tacular success story in the history of American 
law." Fred H. Miller, The Uniform
Commercial Code: Will the Experiment Continue?, 43 
MERCER L. REv. 799, 808 (1992) (cit-
ing JAMES J. WImTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3 (3d ed.
1988)). The Article is, according to one scholar, "the 
crowning achievement of the
UCC project, and perhaps the entire uniform law enterprise." 
Edward J. Janger, Pre-
dicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, 
and the Race to the Bottom,
83 IowA L. REv. 569, 571 (1998); see also Edward Rubin, 
Efficiency, Equity and the Pro-
posed Revisions of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 557 
(1991) (noting that for
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Article 9. Powerful, creative, comprehensive yet elegant, 3 Article 9 is
generally regarded as the most innovative of the Code's articles. Pro-
ceeding from the assumption that secured credit is a good thing-
perhaps the best thing-Article 9 would be the means to facilitate se-
cured lending.4 This would be accomplished by making secured lend-
ing simple, cheap, and, well, secure.5
Secured credit might be made simple, cheap, and certain
through a variety of expedients, from skeletal, idiot-proof financing
statements with little potential for drafting error, to bright-line rules
for creating and perfecting the security interest. What "facilitates" se-
cured credit more than any of those, however, is an idea that under-
lies the whole regime of secured credit-that is, the reigning
conceptualization of the security interest as "property." Because the
security interest has found its way into that particular and historically
hallowed legal category, Article 9's secured parties are figures of privi-
commercial law scholars of their generation, the greatest conceptual achievement in
the field was Article 9). Even the reporters for Revised Article 9 displayed appropriate
reverence in tinkering with what they described as perhaps the most successful statute
ever conceived. Steven Harris & Charles Mooney, A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2021 (1994). Doubtless,
the most stunning achievement of Article 9 is the elimination of the bewildering array
of pre-Code security devices (the chattel mortgage, pledge, conditional sale, and so
forth) together with the equally bewildering array of rules that governed them.
3 Although the principle draftsperson of Article 9 was Grant Gilmore, this style
of drafting is most commonly associated with Karl Llewellyn, primary architect of the
Code, and, in both legislative drafting and judging, has been referred to as the Grand
Style or Grand Tradition. See generally Karl Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the
Grand Tradition, 9 U. CHii. L. Sc-r. Ric. 6 (1960), reprinted inJURISPRUDENCE 215 (1962)
(discussing the hallmarks of this style and extolling its virtues).
4 The first half of the twentieth century witnessed the invention of a dizzying
array of disparate security devices, each governing a particular pattern of personal
property financing, and each boasting its own terminology, limitations, rules of prior-
ity, etc. By the late 1940s, the law of chattel security was decidedly nonuniform and
excruciatingly complex. The seminal treatment of pre-Code security devices can be
found in 1 GRANT GILMORE, SEcuRrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, 1-286 (1965).
It was against this backdrop that the primary drafters of Article 9, Gilmore and Allison
Dunham, undertook to establish a unified'statute covering all forms of personal prop-
erty financing transactions, imposing uniformity, order, and predictability. See id.
1-400.
5 See pre-revised U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1972) ("The aim of this Article is to pro-
vide a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-day
secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater
certainty.").
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lege among all creditors, enjoying a pervasive "property priority"
under state law and even in bankruptcy.d
Of course, if one group of creditors is to be privileged, another
must necessarily be deprived-these are principally unsecured 
credi-
tors who cannot reach assets encumbered by security 
interests to sat-
isfy their claims, and, again, irrespective of whether 
they assert those
claims in or out of bankruptcy. The descriptive 
and functional antith-
esis of secured creditors, unsecured creditors own 
no interest cogniza-
ble as property; their claims are solely in personam. 
For that reason,
the unsecured creditor withers before the ownership 
interest of the
Article 9 secured party, and it makes not a whit 
of difference how the
unsecured claim was acquired (i.e., whether by consent 
or as redress
for an injury committed by the debtor). It is difficult to 
imagine a set
of circumstances better calculated to precipitate 
debate, and so it has.
The property priority of Article 9 has been challenged 
as inefficient by
some, 7 inequitable by others,
8 and all to no avail.9 The impact of de-
6 As the U.C.C. has been adopted in one version 
or another in every state, state
law distribution rules refer, in fact, to priority 
rules. Those govern disputes arising
between unsecured creditors and lien creditors 
(who became secured the hard way)
and Article 9 secured parties. The long and 
the short of it is, where secured parties
have perfected their security interests, they 
trump the lien creditors. U.C.C. § 9-
317(a) (2) (2006) [all references to the U.C.C. are, unless 
otherwise indicated, to the
most recent version of the U.C.C., which was 
published in 2006]. In bankruptcy, a
trustee deploying the power of a hypothetical 
lien creditor is likewise subordinate to
the perfected security interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) 
(2000). The treatment af-
forded secured claims in bankruptcy has always 
been a matter of controversy. See
generally David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and 
the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valua-
tions, 41 AM. U. L. Rrv. 63 (1991) (arguing that valuation 
theories developed by bank-
ruptcy courts are neither objective nor subjective but instead 
are subjunctive).
7 We refer here, of course, to the extensive 
body of literature on the distributive
consequences of secured credit consequences, that 
is, for unsecured creditors. Much
of that discourse-the so-called puzzle literature-was 
devoted to the question
whether secured credit was efficient. In the 1970s, 
prominent legal scholars began to
question fundamental assumptions upon which secured 
credit as an institution rests,
such as the conventional thinking that secured 
credit expands credit markets and
makes more credit available. Early sightings are 
in the work of Thomas Jackson and
Anthony Kronman. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson 
& Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Fi-
nancing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE 
LJ. 1143 (1979). That work proposed
that the justification for secured credit was to be found in 
the net gain realized from
reduced monitoring costs, not in some mythical 
net gain in the form of an increase in
high risk loans that, but for secured credit, 
would not be made at all. Id. at 1153.
Above all, Jackson and Kronman had exposed 
a curiosity-the conventional rationale
for secured credit could not explain the existence 
of what appeared to be an ineffi-
cient institution. Id. at 1158-61. The explicit 
declaration of secured credit to be a
puzzle, together with the challenge to solve it, 
was issued thereafter by Professor Alan
Schwartz. See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and 
Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Cur-
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claring the security interest to be property does not, however, end at
the level of discreet individual priority disputes.
The property priority granted a secured claimant, coupled with
expansion in the forms of collateral amenable to capture under Arti-
cle 9 ushered in by the 1998 revision,' 0 create the opportunity to
rent Theories, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981). There followed a torrent of puzzle articles.
See, e.g., James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VA N. L.
RE\,. 473 (1984). The efficiency debate is "efficiently" summarized in Jay L. West-
brook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEx. L. REV. 795, 831-43 (2004).
8 In the wake of the failure of the law and economics literature to provide a
solution to the puzzle of secured credit, only the "folk theory" (the conventional pre-
mise that secured credit made credit easier to be had) was left standing. Lawrence
Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible Force:
Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 Mic-. L. REv.
2234, 2257 (1997). How secured credit can exist if it is inefficient is irrelevant to the
present Article-it does. However, its attendant costs to unsecured creditors, and
justifying secured credit on a normative basis, are of central concern. See also id. at
2258 ("[F] olk theory does not offer a normative justification at all.").
Another group of scholars seem to have recognized this issue, pointing out the
harmful effects worked on some classes of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy owing to
the priorty of secured creditors. The group, led in its early incarnation by Professor
Lynn LoPucki, was branded "Sympathetic Legal Studies" by Harris and Mooney, supra
note 2, at 2045, or the shorthand, if unflattering, "Symps." The label is likely unmer-
ited in that others have offered proper law-and-economics efficiency explanations for
the same sort of adjustments to priority rules proposed by the Symps. See, e.g., Lucian
A. Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE
LJ. 857, 913-21 (1996). On the other hand, whereas the worst the finance literature
has to say about secured credit is that it is, or might be, inefficient, LoPucki declares it
"blight." See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887,
1914 n.104 (1994).
In any event, it is reasonably accurate to say that, on the Symp view, some un-
secured creditors are victims of secured credit and the priority given secured creditors
in bankruptcy. Id. at 1896-1902. Briefly, Professor LoPucki submits that secured
credit enables the debtor and its secured creditors to enjoy a kind of subsidy at the
expense of an array of unsecured creditors. Id. at 1920-21. Unsecured creditors, of
course, are not privy to the bargain between the debtors and the secured party that
generates the subsidy, either because they did not transact voluntarily with the debtor,
or because they are too uninformed and unsophisticated to recognize that it is being
imposed on them. Id. at 1924-31.
9 See infra note 10.
10 Revised Article 9 became available for enactment by the states in 1999, with a
delayed effective date of July 1, 2001. U.C.C. § 9-701 (2006). In its final form, it
represented a complete victory for the conveyancing model of security by making it
easier than ever before to create and perfect security interests in virtually anything
and everything with accompanying changes in the priority rules that offer even
stronger protection for the security interest against other claimants. See generally Ju-
lian B. McDonnell, Is Revised Article 9 a Little Too Greedy?, 104 Com. LJ. 241, 250
(1999) (expressing concern that, collectively, the new provisions on scope, filing and
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render the interests of unsecured creditors as a group worthless from
the get-go through so-called "judgment-proofing." Judgment-proof-
ing is a simple matter of the debtor incurring debt secured under the
terms of an "all-assets" financing statement in an amount that is, or
more likely becomes, in excess of the liquidation value of its assets-
and often foreseeably so. In this, security unchecked may impose a
threat to the entire liability system." That result, however, does not
have to flow from the prevailing understanding of security as property.
It is our contention that if the security interest is property, then se-
cured credit deployed as a judgment-proofing scheme is a misuse of
property. As in all matters of misuse, the law should supply a remedy.
The remedy in the case of secured credit, however, has not been obvi-
ous, perhaps because those who have sought such a remedy have al-
ways done so by challenging the basic precepts of the property-based
conception of security. A more fruitful approach, we believe, is to
indulge the property metaphor on its own terms and then find a solu-
tion within the entailments that naturally flow from the metaphor.
The tort of nuisance has long safeguarded the quiet enjoyment of
landowners from disturbance in the form of unwelcome, harmful ac-
tivity conducted on neighboring property. That is to say, the consider-
able freedom of use that attends private land ownership is not without
boundaries, and those boundaries are drawn somewhere at the edges
of a neighbor's quiet enjoyment. With property rights come property
responsibilities, and we would submit that it is analytically inconsequen-
tial whether those rights are real or personal, corporeal or
incorporeal.
Bewildering it is that a culture long intolerant of a nuisance that
threatens the quiet enjoyment of land should be so at ease with an
equally, if not more, noxious nuisance created by a personal property
interest-namely, the denigration of the rights of unsecured creditors
through the misuse of security. There is no currently recognized tort
of nuisance to regulate the unreasonable, even reprehensible, use of
priority could encourage preemptive filings designed to judgment-proof enterprises
fearing tort liabilities or other unsecured claims).
11 This is a major premise of Professor LoPucki's article, Lynn M. Lopucki, The
Death of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. 1, 14-19 (1996). The liability system, as LoPucki de-
scribes it, centers around the satisfied judgment. Id. at 14. With the value of an insol-
vent debtor's assets conveyed away to the secured creditor, nothing remains for
general creditors, either in or out of bankruptcy, rendering the basic component of
the liability system worthless. Id. Professor LoPucki's theses quickly became the ob-
ject of scholarly attention expressed in a series of replies and rejoinders in the litera-
ture. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgwent Proofing, 52
STAN. L. REv. I (1999);JamesJ. White, CorporateJudgmrent Proofing: A Response to Lynn
LoPucki's The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998).
2006]
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secured credit. But that is hardly to say that secured credit cannot be
deployed after a fashion prejudicial to neighboring interests in a
credit community-in other words, after a fashion that is eerily remi-
niscent of a private nuisance. This suggests that perhaps the time has
come to "discover" a tort that redresses that wrong in the same fashion
as the ancient tort of private nuisance responds to unreasonable ex-
cesses by landowners.
In this Article, therefore, we maintain that secured credit, when
perverted to accomplish a de facto judgment-proofing scheme, is a
nuisance, and a nuisance appropriately "abated" through the existing
and well-accepted principles of subordination. To establish this pro-
position, in Part I we discuss the security interest as a member of the
legal category "property," a conception of security emphatically em-
braced and reinforced on revision of Article 9. In addition, we try to
articulate why the understanding of security as property has been so
persistent and difficult to uproot.
In Part II, we examine and evaluate the implications of inclusion
of the security interest in the conceptual category of property with ref-
erence to insights into categorization that have emerged from recent
work in cognitive linguistics. Much of what we do in law is about cate-
gorizing, such that these insights into human conceptual systems shed
new light on the development of law, and thereby offer the opportu-
nity to consider the transformation of legal doctrine from a fresh
perspective.
Having accepted (without necessarily agreeing with) the notion
of the security interest as entailing a conveyance of property, and also
explained the conceptual consequences that flow from that category,
in Part III we turn to an excursus into the law of nuisance as a corol-
lary of the legal category "property." Then, in Part IV, we conflate the
discussion, making the case that nuisance doctrine offers a workable
and defensible rubric to ferret out and condemn the use of security as
a device for judgment-proofing. Lastly, in Part V, we propose what we
believe to be the remedial response most neatly tailored to abate the
"nuisance," that being full or partial subordination of the secured
claim.
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I. THE SECURITY INTEREST AS A MEMBER OF THE LEGAL
CATEGORY PROPERTY
A. The Good Ship "Conceptual Alternatives" Has Sailed...
The security interest, we are instructed, owes its existence to a
security agreement that "creates or provides for it,"12 suggesting, it
would seem, that the concepts by which security is understood are
mainly those same legal concepts that structure the law of contracts.1 3
In fact, however, there is fundamentally very little about security, as we
have come to regard it, that depends on conceptual structures other
than those that derive from property law. The evidence is everywhere,
and the fact that security is about property, plain and simple, is frankly
granted.' 4 It is a matter on which there is nearly universal accord,
albeit not universally cheerful accord. 15
12 U.C.C. § 9-102(a) (73) (2006). This aspect of the definition of "security agree-
ment" was also found in the 1972 version of the statute. See pre-revised U.C.C. § 9-
105(1)(l) (1972).
13 Of course, the security agreement is in many regards just that-an agreement.
U.C.C. § 9-203 contains statute of frauds and consideration (value given) require-
ments. But the security agreement in its most significant sense is understood as some-
thing of a deed. The controversial features of Article 9 (namely priorities and
consequent implications for unsecured creditors) are a product of the property con-
cepts and its attendants, most notably, the imperative nemo dat. In this singular re-
gard, the security agreement is a conveyancing document, For the most part, the role
of contract doctrine is limited to defining the relationship of the debtor and secured
creditor. See generally F. Stephen Knippenberg, Future Nonadvance Obligations: Prefer-
ences Lost in Metaphor, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1537, 1571-80 (1994) (offering an account of
the security agreement as contract and the metaphors that structure the contract
relationship).
14 References in the literature which take as a given that security is property are
common. See, e.g., James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bank-
ruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 59
(1991) (referring to the secured creditor as a co-owner of the collateral with the
debtor). In The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the
Relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973
(1983), ProfessorJames Rogers states, "The notion that the secured creditor's reme-
dial right is a 'property' right may derive much of its intuitive force from the percep-
tion of the mortgage on Blackacre as the paradigm of secured financing." Id. at 992
n.74. The idea that the creation of a security interest is a conveyance is thus largely
unquestioned and deeply entrenched in doctrine. But the idea of the security inter-
est as property first becomes an express policy justification for secured credit at the
hands of Harris and Mooney. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2024-25,
2047-66.
15 Professor LoPucki, for example, is not convinced security is property (or, per-
haps, that it should be) in every way. Rather, he regards that position to be only a
"theory" (and a bad one, he believes) by which security has come to be understood
and justified, See LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1947-48, 1952-54; see also Carl S. Bjerre,
2006]
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There have been sensible challenges to the conveyance 
model of
security, 16 but they have largely fallen on 
deaf ears as far as the
lawmakers are concerned
. 1
7 Article 9 clings relentlessly to this philo-
sophical supposition, more so than ever in the revision, 
and efforts to
discredit or dislodge it have, in a word, failed. Rather 
than flail away
further at the hegemony of the property-based 
understanding of se-
curity, we think at this stage it is more productive 
to inquire why it has
emerged as hegemonous. Unquestionably, there 
are many reasons,
but we posit three that are not only plausible, 
but we believe also re-
vealing in determining where we go from here.
First (and this has nothing directly to do with the 
property
model) is the metaphysics of objectivism, discussed more 
fully be-
low,18 but consisting essentially of a set of epistemological 
convictions
that hold that the world of experience is a world 
ordered without re-
gard to human conceptual systems. On the 
objectivist account,
things, phenomena, and events stand in implicit 
and largely static as-
sociation, possess innate characteristics, and occupy 
naturally occur-
ring categories. Objectivist assumptions pervade nearly 
every
intellectual endeavor,
19 and in law find expression as "formalism,"
20
the notion of positive legal rules capable of producing 
results with the
reassuring predictability of a mathematical 
postulate. From this
Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge 
Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 305, 349 n.1
7 8 (1999) (discussing critiques of the security-as-property
metaphor); Steve Knippenberg, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain: An 
Essay in Reply, Re-
prisal, or Support?, 80 VA. L. Rev. 1967, 1972 n.2
2 (1994) ("The notion that the crea-
tion of a security interest is a transfer of property 
is deeply rooted in doctrine and is
clearly the dominant conceptualization of security.").
16 The most notable, perhaps, being the Warren 
"carve-out" proposal, which one
of the authors had involvement in drafting. 
See Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the
Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CORNELL 
L. REv. 1466
(1997); Elizabeth Warren, An Article 9 Set-Aside for Unsecured Creditors, 
51 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 323 (1997).
17 Professor Charles Mooney, one of the co-reporters 
for the Article 9 revision
process, described the reaction to the carve-out 
proposal at the Drafting Committee
as having "died for lack of a first." See LYNN 
M. LoPucKi & ELIZABETH WARREN, SE-
CURED CREDIT 659 (5th ed. 2006).
18 See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
19 This is a philosophical heritage traceable to Kant 
and Descartes. See generally
JONATHAN BENNETr, KANT'S ANALYTIC 130 (1966) (stating that 
for Kant, "self-con-
sciousness is possible only to a being who has experience 
of an objective realm");
RENE DESCARTES, RULES FOR TIE DIRECTION 
OF THE MIND (1628), reprinted in 1 THE
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARrES 9, 
9-76 (John Cottingham et al. trans., 1985)
(discussing twenty-one rules by which problems 
are simplified through intuition and
deduction). Not even mathematics escapes objectivist postulates. 
See GEORGE LAKOFF,
WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS 
368-69 (1987).
20 See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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fiercely rational orientation, propositional answers are derived that
promise certainty in a manner that alternative imaginative and meta-
phoric structures of thought on their face do not.21 Propositional an-
swers, no less an appealing commodity in legal reasoning than in any
other endeavor, are doubtless especially attractive in the context of
the law governing banks, finance companies, merchants, and their
lawyers. The superimposition of syllogistic reasoning on what may in
fact be largely metaphoric reasoning processes, as we shall discuss, cre-
ates an arguably false but nonetheless comforting sense of
determinacy.
Second (and this is directly relevant to the conveyance theory of
security), to model security on property concepts invokes a powerful
set of real and emotive associations unique to private property owner-
ship, and particularly ownership of land. Early in the history of the
Republic, good citizenship and a host of other highly revered virtues
were closely associated with the ownership of land. 22 Beyond this
(and far beyond this), property ownership is closely bound with no-
tions of liberty: "Property was important for the exercise of liberty,
and liberty required the free exercise of property rights .... Without
security [protection), property lost its value."23
Finally, on a related but individual level, the dimensions of the
concept of property-the most salient of which is "boundedness"-
were seen as assuring personal autonomy, privacy, and "freedom from
the collective."24 The boundary image, central to traditional concep-
21 See infra text accompanying notes 39-43.
22 See Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary
America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 474-76 (1976) (discussing Jefferson's notions about
land ownership, independent labor, and politics). In the mid-eighteenth century,
every American colony, save one, limited the suffrage to those who owned land. Rob-
ertJ. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. Rrv. 335,
337 (1989). There was popular consensus that there was no real independence with-
out private property ownership. Id. Chief among the concerns associated with creat-
ing a new government was protection of private property. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law,
Boundaries and the Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER Or CULTURE 162, 162-63 (Rob-
ert Post ed., 1991). Adams once remarked, "[V]ery few men who have no property,
have anyjudgment of their own." Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, in 9 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMs 376 (C. Adams ed., Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1864).
23 Nedelsky, supra note 22, at 164. The author continues, "Property effectively
captures this link between liberty and security in that it literally loses its meaning
without security. We mean by property that which is recognized to be ours and can-
not easily be taken from us-hence the connection between property and ... law and
government." Id. at 165.
24 This, of course, is consistent with Charles Reich's renowned article, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). In calling for a new definition of property, Reich
asserts: "Property draws a circle around the activities of each private individual or
2006]
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tions of property, offers an unparalleled symbol of autonomy 
and indi-
vidual freedom.
2 5
In short, the concept of property is a powerful rhetorical 
device.
Understanding security in terms of "property" implies 
a close affilia-
tion with that device, and pronouncing the security 
to be "property"
thus captures a set of highly revered associations. 
That, it seems to us,
diminishes mightily the prospect of unseating the conveyancing 
meta-
phor now or in the future.
26 To exalt the security interest to the level
of property is to corroborate and firmly embed 
the Article 9 first-in-
time priority into the legal landscape in a manner 
that assures the
supremacy of secured creditors for a long time to 
come.27 To control
the metaphor by which secured credit is understood 
is to control pre-
sumptively the outcome in priority disputes between 
secured and un-
secured creditors. In the most recent reform, the 
drafters of Revised
Article 9 controlled the metaphor, with 
predictable consequences.
28
organization. Within that circle the owner has 
a greater degree of freedom than with-
out.... Within, he is master, and the state must 
explain and justify any interference."
Id. at 771.
25 Nedelsky, supra note 22, at 166-67; see also 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New
Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern 
Concept of Property, 29
BUFF. L. Rrv. 325, 328-30 (1980) (claiming that the conceptual 
shift in the early twen-
tieth century from property as "thing ownership" 
to the bundle of rights metaphor
devalued the serviceability of property in defining 
the boundaries between the indi-
vidual and the state).
26 The alignment of security with property exploits 
allied notions: the sanctity of
freedom of contract and free alienability of property. 
They may be part of the basis
for property priority generally. See Ponoroff & 
Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2261.
There is a tasty irony in the association of secured 
credit with property and the noble
entailments that follow from that association. If 
early on property ownership was sym-
bolic of autonomy, virtuous labor, and liberty, the 
prospect of a debtor having posses-
sion of collateral while its value resided in a creditor was 
regarded as fraud. See, e.g.,
Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275, 279-80 (Pa. 1819). 
These courts reasoned that
the debtor with possession of the mortgaged collateral 
was in a position to dupe other
creditors into the mistaken belief that the encumbered 
asset would be available to
satisfy their unsecured claims in the event of default. 
Of course, Article 9 resolved the
"ostensible ownership" problem-the problem that the collateral in the hands 
of the
debtor looks precisely the same after its value has 
been conveyed away to the secured
creditor as it did before. See U.C.C. § 9-205 cmt. 2. However, 
the problems associated
with the redistributive effect of security, obviously, 
remain.
27 Simply put, we believe those who are convinced 
more secured credit is better
than less will not relinquish the powerful ally they 
find in property as a legal category.
See Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: 
The Article 9 Full Priority
Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1386 (1997) ("The credit-constriction 
claim is the
most forceful weapon in the arsenal of the proponents 
of full priority.").
28 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Assured of priority, so the theory goes, the purveyors 
of debt fi-
nancing will more readily part with their capital and 
more readily ac-
cept risk that would be intolerable without the comfort 
of collateral to
hedge the risk of insolvency. Affordable (and, ergo, abundant)
credit-undeniably a good thing in terms 
of promoting en-
trepreneurial activity and sustaining business growth-nevertheless
sours if not disciplined in some manner to ensure 
the reasonable
alignment of risk and reward.
29 Among other salutary effects, the
threat of withdrawal of the privileges attendant 
to taking security
might encourage secured lenders to engage in 
more rational credit
decisions, as well as more careful monitoring of credit 
once extended,
albeit possibly at somewhat higher credit costs 
in certain cases.30 To
be sure, a more balanced approach to the revision 
of Article 9 might
have perhaps produced such a result and done 
so in a far more effi-
cient fashion than we propose here. Certainly 
the proposals were out
there, but they were dismissed before they arrived.
3
' They were dis-
missed precisely because they were at odds with 
the drafters' commit-
ment to a conveyance model of security.
And so, we are resigned to the fact that no paradigm 
shift is in the
offing, not in our lifetimes and probably well beyond. 
Revised Article
9 has seen to it that propositional reasoning 
and an objectivist ap-
proach to legal categories will continue the intractable, 
outcome-re-
quired definition of security as "property" in 
the most ontological
sense of the term. But that is by no means to suggest 
that alternative
insights into conceptual categories cannot inform 
analysis and yet en-
able law transformation aimed at a more equitable 
distributive bal-
ance, or at least do so in the most egregious cases. 
The potential of
those insights to accomplish both is explored 
in Part II, but first we
offer a more detailed explanation of the contours 
and consequences
of the conventional view of legal categories that 
controls our contem-
porary understanding of security. It is then against 
that backdrop that
29 See infra text accompanying notes 101-08; infra note 
209 and accompanying
text.
30 The empirical evidence is, frankly, still 
unanswered. Cf Ronald J. Mann, Ex-
plaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REv. 625, 
638-58 (1997) (offering
some empirical evidence on what motivates 
parties to elect between secured and un-
secured credit). However, even accepting the proposition 
that full priority rules effec-
tively lower the cost of credit, this still begs the 
question of whether that is a good
thing. Ultimately, the answer to that question 
depends on whether the reduction in
the price of credit imposes costs on other parties, 
like unsecured creditors, in excess
of the savings derived from security. See Warren, 
supra note 27, at 1388-92 (identify-
ing other costs to consider beyond purely the 
price of credit).
31 SeeJanger, supra note 2, at 575; see also supra 
note 17 (discussing the rejection
of the carve-out proposal in the Article 9 revision 
process).
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we consider the perceptiveness and the possibilities offered 
by an al-
ternative approach to categorization of legal concepts 
as it applies to
law in general, and security in particular.
B. The Objectivist Account of Legal Categories
While it is convenient fov many purposes to understand 
security
in property terms, the conception of the security interest 
as property is
by no means required. 32 It is one thing to say that 
security is concep-
tually defined with reference to property concepts and something 
else
again to observe that it is property in an 
a priori sense.33
But that distinction, as fundamental and consequential 
as it may
be, is often blurred or even lost because legal categories 
have come to
be understood generally in conventional terms. And 
the conventional
view has it that conceptual categories in law as elsewhere 
must be con-
structed by reference to necessary and sufficient indicia 
or conditions
for category membership.
34 In turn, those conditions are existentially
determinate as are the categories they define. They 
are not, that is to
say, dependent upon any contribution from the cognitive 
operators of
the reasoner, but enjoy an ontological status quite apart from mental
(conceptual) categories.35 A thing is inherently "P or not P" 
because
it is possessed or not of the characteristics naturally 
residing in the
category at hand. Category membership, as it comes 
to be deter-
mined, is therefore objectively verifiable by comparison to a set 
of
conditions that obtain in the natural world external 
to human con-
32 See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, 
Debtors Who Convert Their
Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 235,
299 (1995) (arguing that the conveyance model of security 
leads to dysfunctional
analysis of conversion of assets from nonexempt 
to exempt immediately before bank-
ruptcy); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2284-86 (calling for 
a value-based,
priority account of secured claims in bankruptcy 
instead of the prevailing conveyance
model). As Professor Bjerre puts it, "[T
] here is no ineluctable reason to consider ...
security interests as property. " Bjerre, supra note 15, at 363. 
There have been
inroads on the conceptual monopoly. For instance, 
in bankruptcy, a secured credi-
tor's secured claim is limited to the value of the 
collateral, not the collateral itself. 11
U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). The notion that 
a security interest does
not necessarily encompass the right of possession 
is inconsistent with the concept of
security as property in every particular. See Peter 
F. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for
the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012, 1028-30 (1978) (suggesting 
that the Code had
moved incrementally away from the concept of security 
as property to a conception of
the security interest as a priority claim).
33 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2285.
34 We refer here, of course, to the classical view of categories. 
It is, however,
more than a view; rather, it is regularly taken as 
empirical fact. See LAKOFF, supra note
19 at 6; Bjerre, supra note 15, at 355.
35 See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARKJOHNSON, METAPHORS 
WE LIVE BY 122-25 (1980).
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cepts.3 6 Under the conventional view, then, it is the business of con-
ceptual categories not simply to emulate but literally to replicate
objective reality, and they are at their worst when they befoul it by
introducing imaginative principles.3
7
For this to occur, conceptual categories are, or must be, precise
representations of categories as they exist in the world external to the
reasoner. And so, on this view, our conceptual categories are al-
gorithmic. They are correct when the symbols they make use of mir-
ror the reality they purport to represent. Otherwise, they are
incorrect and there is neither room for near nor far membership.
As noted earlier,38 the conventional view proceeds from objectiv-
ist assumptions about the world of experience, 39 and in law finds ex-
pression in the dogma of formalism. The formalist strategy, so
familiar by now as to be second nature in traditional legal analysis, is
to abstract principles from cases, then apply those principles to suc-
ceeding cases.40 The principles themselves, on boiling away the fac-
tual content of the cases from which they are gleaned and extracted,
now purport to be amenable to disinterested application in subse-
quent fact-rich cases by neutral judges. The neutrality can be sup-
posed, so long as the principles are properly understood and brought
36 The popular view of conceptual categories "understands categorization either
as about natural sets of objects in the world or, when it recognizes categorization as
humanly constructed, as about objects with ascertainable properties or criteria that
establish their commonality." Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1108 (1989) (expli-
cating the work of Lakoff and Johnson on conceptual categories). The associated
epistemology is sometimes referred to generally as "objectivism." See MARKJOHNSON,
THE BODY I THE MIND 196 (1987); LAKorr, supra note 19, at 157-84. On the objectiv-
ist account, the world is comprised of various phenomena, events, and objects inher-
ently possessed of naturally occurring characteristics, properties and relationships.
These are mind-independent. Id. at 8-11; see also RICHARDJ. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OB-
JECTWIVSM AND RELATivisM 8 (1983) (using the term "objectivism" in the same sense as
Lakoff and Johnson).
37 Professor jerre states it nicely: "Every categorization question thus has a sim-
ple, yes or no answer; the object either belongs or does not belong, and no intermedi-
ate result is possible. Under this view, we categorize stimuli based solely on objective
criteria that are independent of the imagination .... The categorization process is com-
puter-like in its objectivity, impersonality and bipolarity." Bjerre, supra note 15, at 355 (em-
phasis added) (footnote omitted).
38 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
39 See supra notes 36-37.
40 The methodology is familiar. Principles are abstracted from cases to be re-
stated as legal propositions. Thereafter, it is only a matter of bringing the proposi-
tions to bear on the facts at hand. See Michael S. Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S.
CAL. L. REv. 151, 155 (1981).
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to bear, because the principles themselves transcend 
their concrete
instantiations in particular cases.
4 1
In this way, objectivism is quietly but forcefully at work in law.
The objectivist program generally insists that knowledge results from
discovering concepts, which directly reflect an objectively verifiable
state of affairs in the physical world, that are in no 
way dependent on
subjective interpretation.42 Formalism presumes a uniquely correct 
res-
olution of legal issues: rights are rights, privileges 
are privileges, a
thing is property or it is not, and, if it is, it is property 
for all purposes,
and that is that.43 This is the sense in which 
the security interest
comes to find inclusion in the conceptual category 
determined to be
"property."
II. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF CATEGORIES: 
PROPERTY AS A
RADIAL CATEGORY
A. Insights of the Cognitive Sciences into the Nature of Categories
Beginning in the 1980s, research in the cognitive 
sciences and
linguistics developed the insight that imaginative cognitive 
devices are
central to human knowledge, understanding, and 
rationality.44 The
view of human cognition to emerge from that work 
has been referred
to by its chief architects as "experientialism,"
45 and stands in sharp
contradistinction to the underlying precepts of objectivism. The 
case
was made that metaphor, for example, is a pervasive 
and critical com-
ponent of human reasoning processes.
46 Metaphoric concepts are
41 See Knippenberg, supra note 13, at 1560-61.
42 SeeJOHNSON, supra note 36, at xxi-xxiv. 
At the root of objectivism, then, is an
epistemology of transcendentalism.
43 See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn 
in Modern Theory: A Turn for the
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 881-90 (1989).
44 "Without imagination, nothing in the world 
could be meaningful." JOHNSON,
supra note 36, at ix; see also LAKOrF &JOHNSON, 
supra note 35, at 3 (making the claim
that ordinary human conceptual systems are metaphoric).
45 See LAKOFF, supra note 19, at xv; see generally LAKOFF 
&JOHNSON, supra note 35,
at 226-28 (noting that experientialism denies both that absolute 
truth exists and that
it is necessary to function successfully). The methodology 
suggested by the insights of
the experientialist program has been brought 
to bear in legal analysis from time to
time. See, e.g., Bjerre, supra note 15; Knippenberg, supra note 13; 
Ponoroff & Knip-
penberg, supra note 32; Ponoroff & Knippenberg, 
supra note 8; Winter, supra note 36.
46 See, e.g., Gerald W. Casenave, Taking Metaphor 
Seriously: The Implications of the
Cognitive Significance of Metaphor for Theories of Language, 17 S.J. 
PHIL. 19 (1979); Paul
Ricoeur, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, 
and Feeling, 5 CRITICAL IN-
QUiRY 143 (1978). The most comprehensive, systematic, and 
important treatment of
the role of metaphor in human cognition is to 
be found in the work of Lakoff and
Johnson. See, e.g., LAKOFF, supra note 19, at 276-78; 
LAKOFF &JOHNSON, supra note 35,
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much more than rhetorical contrivances to be consigned to the do-
main of the poetic. 47 Rather, in direct contravention to the objectivist
account, experientialism teaches that our metaphoric concepts are
central to cognitive operations.
Metaphoric reasoning is primary in complex thought; that is to
say, it is fundamental to all but the most rudimentary concepts, 48 and,
of equal import, it is unavoidable. The essence of metaphoric reason-
ing makes it possible to understand and reason about concepts that
lack natural dimensions of their own in terms of other well-defined
concepts, 49 and to do so without declaring the former to be the latter
in a literal sense. A simple example from legal doctrine serves to illus-
trate. The concept, "contract," is partially delineated by the meta-
phor, "a-contract-is-a-container-for-the-contracting-parties." The
metaphoric concept is evident in the language. For instance, parties
"enter into the contract" and "cannot get out of the contract. ' 0
at 61-105;JJOHNSON, supra note 36, at 65-100. They refer to their account of human
rationality and associated epistemology as "experiential realism" or, simply, "experien-
tialism." See LAKOFF, supra note 19, at xv. Other scholarly exegesis of metaphor has
been undertaken by rhetoricians and other language scholars, among them Max
Black. See MAx BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHOR 25-47, 49 (1962). For a more com-
plete listing, see Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053 (1989).
47 SeeJOHNSON, supra note 36, at 112 ("[Mletaphors . . . are not merely conve-
nient economies for expressing our knowledge; rather they are our knowledge. .. ");
see also LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 5 ("The metaphor is not merely in the
words we use-it is in our very concept of an argument. The language of argument is
not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is literal.").
48 Rudimentary concepts are those apprehended directly through our senses,
from interaction with our physical surroundings. They include such concepts as "up-
down," "containment," "verticality," "part-whole," "front-back," and so forth. LAKOFF
& JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 57. These are "natural kinds of experience," as they
have naturally occurring dimensions and so are directly understood on their own
terms-not in terms of other concepts-without the necessity of sophisticated cogni-
tive mechanisms such as metaphoric reasoning. Id. at 117-19. These experiences are
meaningful because they recur endlessly as we interact with our physical surround-
ings. JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 13. These recurring patterns are the basis for kines-
thetic image schematic structures, or "image schema." Id. at 28-30.
49 This is the essence of the experientialist claim. For example, the concept
trouble" lacks natural dimensions of its own, and so must be understood indirectly
through the metaphor, "trouble-is-a-container." The emergent concept, "contain-
ment," partially delineates the concept "trouble," such that we can understand our-
selves as being "in trouble," or unable to "get out of trouble." LAKOFF & JOHNSON,
supra note 35, at 29-32. The stick-like, simple structure of image schematic concepts,
such as "containment," allow for this kind of cross-conceptualization. Id. at 29.
50 Of course, the single ontological metaphor does not offer a complete under-
standing of the target concept. Instead, the metaphor highlights one aspect of the
concept under consideration. Multiple metaphors must be deployed to enrich other
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Another vital component of human rationality, and 
of immediate
relevance to this Article, is categorization.
5 1 The process is critical to
making sense of our experience and, as shown above, 
it can influence
our understanding of legal concepts. The insights 
of the experiential-
ist program have shown that human conceptual 
categories are not (or
do not have to be) constructed around mind-independent 
objects
with innate properties that are perfunctorily 
compared with a set of
naturally occurring conditions of category membership.
5 2 To the con-
trary, categories, like other components of rationality, 
are dependent
upon imaginative, or creative, conceptual 
principles. 53
While other types of conceptual category structures 
have been
catalogued,54 the "radial" category is directly apposite 
for present pur-
poses and exists in sharp contrast to the conventional 
view of catego-
ries that has pervaded legal thought and reasoning. 
Radial categories
are ideational constructs of rationality. According 
to the experiential-
ist view, radial categories are structured around 
a central category
member, or so-called "best example.
55 This is the category proto-
type.5 6 Categorization then entails determining if, and the degree 
to
which, a stimulus under consideration shares 
properties with the cen-
tral category member.
5 7 The extent and level of sharing-the degree
to which the stimulus is representative of the 
category as expressed
through the category prototype-determines 
relative membership.
aspects of the concept to arrive at meaning. For 
instance, contract obligations are
also understood metaphorically as physical burdens. 
JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 35.
51 See LAKOFF, supra note 19, at 5 ("There is nothing more 
basic than categoriza-
tion to our thought, perception, action, and speech.").
52 JoHNsoN, supra note 36, at 24.
53 Under the experientialist view, categories are 
conceptual, that is to say, con-
structs of imaginative human perception, rather 
than inherent properties of objects.
Id. at 23-28. Thus, conceptual categories are not 
slices of reality trapped and mim-
icked symbolically; rather, they are our reality. They 
are the means by which experi-
ence is organized and made meaningful. For an excellent, 
manageable summation of
these principles, see Winter, supra note 36, at 1148-56.
54 See Lakoff, supra note 19, at 287-88 (describing, for example, 
graded and sca-
lar categories).
55 Bjerre, supra note 15, at 356.
56 Professor Bjerre offers the simple but instructive example-the 
conceptual cat-
egory "cup." Id. at 356-57. After noting the failure 
of the objectivist account of con-
ceptual categories to account for the manner 
in which we deploy that category in
experience, he explains: "The radial approach offers 
a much more satisfactory expla-
nation: the prototypical characteristics of a cup 
can be said to be exemplified by a
coffee cup or a teacup, and everything else to which 
we apply the word 'cup' shares
one or more of those characteristics according to 
various principles." Id.
57 See id. at 355-56. For an extended discussion of 
the context of legal categoriza-
tion, see Winter, supra note 36, at 1148-59.
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The radial model thus admits of "graded" membership, in a man-
ner that conventional categories do not,58 such that category mem-
bers may be understood to "radiate" from the category prototype.59
Where the reasoner is persuaded (although, actually, most categoriza-
tion occurs at the unconscious level6° ) that there is a correspondence
of characteristics and a sufficient degree of correspondence, category
membership is assigned and awarded. Otherwise, it is denied.61
It is important to recognize that characteristic sharing is not lim-
ited to literal sharing. Correspondence of characteristics can indeed,
and frequently do, occur at the nonliteral level. For instance, a poten-
tial member might share traits with the category prototype at the met-
aphoric level through extension. 62 The principle is illustrated using
the security interest as an example in Part II.B., which follows.
B. Property Understood as a Radial Category
The legal conceptual category "property," like any other concep-
tual category, can be structured radially. 6 - This produces a much
more nuanced and contextualized understanding of the concept and
what it means to be a member of the category than can be had under
the conventional view. The central member, or category prototype,
might be the "house,' 64 and its salient features would include at least
the following: a physical locus and stability over time. The house is
58 See supra text accompanying note 43.
59 See LAxorv, supra note 19, at 91-114.
60 "Ontological metaphors . .. are so pervasive in our thought that they are usu-
ally taken as self-evident, direct descriptions of mental phenomena." LAKOFF & JOHN-
SON, sUpra note 35, at 28.
61 This is not the same as asserting that category membership is assigned on the
basis of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, it is to say that, "At some point,
the resemblance of a stimulus to a prototype grows weak enough (though it may still
exist) that people do not include the stimulus in the category. This point is deter-
mined not by any objective measure, but by tacit social convention. This convention is
presumably based, in turn, on a balance between the usefulness and the confusion
that would result from inclusion." Bjerre, supra note 15, at 356 & n.202; see also
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 145 (making a similar point).
62 Four such principles have been identified and described, including extension
by metaphor. For a truncated but enlightening account of the principles of extension
illustrated utilizing the legal category "property," see Bjerre, supra note 15, at 355 &
n.202.
63 Our treatment of the conceptual category "property" as a radial category draws
on the work of Professor Bjerre. See id. at 354-64.
64 Id. at 357 n.208. As Professor Bjerre explains:
While this choice is not inevitable, it is strongly justifiable. In my own un-
scientific survey.. . the image most strongly called to nearly everyone's mind
by the word property was the single-family house surrounded by land. It is
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utile and functional. It offers, among other things, safety, security,
and a place of residence. It has value and so represents a source of
wealth. It is freely alienable by the owner, who has the nearly absolute
right to deploy its value according to his or her whim. Value added by
way of improvements inure to the benefit of the owner. The house
quite literally serves to exclude others than the owner and the owner
has the right to exclude as well. So what do houses have to do with
security interests?
Under the radial model, the security interest finds its way into the
legal category "property" not because it is a house of course, but ow-
ing instead to the characteristics it shares with the category prototype,
literally and nonliterally.65 Literally, the security interest is alienable;
it represents a form of wealth and, arguably, is the product of the
owner's labor.6 6 But it is obvious that the security interest is more
representative of the prototype at the metaphoric level, the level at
which there is a closer correspondence of traits that explain inclusion
of the security interest in the property category. For example, the se-
curity interest in inventory, accounts, and other self-renewing forms of
collateral enjoys stability or duration.67 The security interest itself is
also the meaning most likely to be carried by a layperson's use of the term:
'Get off of my property!'
Id. Because central membership is a matter of cultural consensus, central members
may come and go over time as the common perception as to the best representative of
the category changes. See Winter, supra note 36, at 1172-74 (describing the changing
conception of the term "park" in the context of an ordinance prohibiting vehicles in
city parks). ProfessorJeanne Schroeder, though she does not analyze property as a
radial category in the terms supplied by the experientialist program, nevertheless un-
dertakes to isolate and describe prototypical property. She posits that a grasped tangi-
ble object may be at the center of the conceptual category. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some
Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 455, 491 (1996). Schroeder's
account of prototypical property forms part of the basis for her earlier article,Jean L.
Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93
MicH. L. REv. 239 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder Bundle of Stix) (examining Jeremy
Waldron's definition of Property).
65 Professor Bjerre illustrates the literal and nonliteral sharing of characteristics
using the patent, as well as the security interest, as examples. Bjerre, supra note 15, at
359-61.
66 Bjerre acknowledges that, perhaps, there is a lingering bias against the notion
that lending is "productive work." The form-of-wealth characteristic might, however,
as easily be expressed as the form-of-protection trait. Id. at 360 n.217.
67 Id. at 361. This is the so-called floating lien, frequently expressed in the famil-
iar, cloud-over-a-river metaphor. The fluctuating mass of self-renewing collateral is
conceptualized as a gestalt, a single entity that grows and shrinks, See also Knip-
penberg, supra note 13, at 1580 (making the claim that Gilmore's "unitary view" of
the security interest is based on the metaphor, "the-security-interest-is-an-expanding
mass" in the context of future advances).
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not a tangible thing, but one of the most singular remedies available
to the secured creditor is the right to seize the tangible personal prop-
erty.68 The right to seize the collateral is conflated with the collateral
seized, creating a recognizable, nonliteral correspondence with the
traits of the tangible category prototype.6 9 The security interest liter-
ally offers "security"-protection, that is to say-from intruders in the
form of other creditors who would lay claim to the collateral; and the
secured creditor has the right to exclude others (other claimants)
who endeavor to gain priority to the collateral.
The security interest is thus a member of the property category by
dint of radial extension from the category prototype accomplished
metaphorically. 70 On acknowledging that the security interest is prop-
erty, but only by virtue of radial extension of a conceptual category, the
way is cleared to do a critical examination of judgments about the
merits (or demerits) of security. By critical examination, we mean an
assessment of the impact of security, and more particularly the rules
relating to the priority of secured claims, on a basis other than pro-
positional results dictated by an unyielding assertion that security is
property.
This brings us to Revised Article 9. It is likely that the revision
process of the 1990s was the last great opportunity for granting that
secured credit might be usefully conceived of as property, but that it
need not be so for all purposes. It was an opportunity, that is to say, to
acknowledge the property/conveyance metaphor to be precisely
that-a metaphor-no less and certainly no more.71 The revision
process presented a forum to entertain models other than the prevail-
ing conveyance model in response to legitimate anxiety over the dis-
68 U.C.C. § 9-609 (2006).
69 Bjerre, supra note 15, at 361. "At work here.. . is a metonymy [where the part
stands for the whole, as in the expression, 'All hands on deck!']: when we speak of a
security interest as property, we understand the right to seize the collateral in terms of
the collateral itself." Id. at n.220 (alteration in original).
70 The phenomenon of radial extension also accounts for the fact that category
members may share little in common with each other.
71 Metaphoric mapping, with the inferential consequences arising from import-
ing entailments to the target domain, allows rational inferences about the target con-
cept. The point to be taken is this: metaphoric reason is, by hypothesis, partial. Since
source and target concepts do not correspond dimension-by-dimension, no one
source concept can fully elaborate a target concept. Multiple metaphors must be
deployed to provide multiple levels of meaning. The failure to recognize that insight
forecloses the introduction of additional source metaphors to enrich meaning, and
hides the differences between source and target concepts. See LAKOFP & JOHNSON,
supra note 35, at 10; see also Knippenberg, supra note 13, at 1571 (making the same
point).
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tributive effects of secured credit on unsecured creditors. The
abiding concern that secured credit, and near-absolute priority af-
forded properly perfected secured claims, unfairly externalized risk
(yielding distributive injustice) were certainly raised, and vigorously
so, 72 but ultimately were dismissed by the drafters without much pause
and certainly without much consideration. 73 In the end, security re-
mained property absolutely. The opportunity for law transformation
at the direct conceptual level has thus come and gone. However, the
wholesale embracement of the traditional property-based account of
security in the revision does not foreclose further consideration within
the perimeters established and dictated by that model, as we turn to
next.
C. The Conveyance Model, Nemo Dat, and the Consequences for the
Credit Community
To call the security interest "property" is to import entailments,
or epistemic consequences, associated with that legal category. Those
entailments are the basis for the irresistible property priority of se-
cured claims that dominated the Article 9 revision process. In this
section, we detail some of the entailments allied with the legal cate-
gory property, as well as consideration of their consequential signifi-
cance for secured credit.
A familiar metaphor structures our understanding of property in
the most elemental manner. Both the historical and contemporary
system of American property law rest squarely on the metaphor of
72 In at least academic circles, the process was something of a showdown on these
matters. Proposals designed to ameliorate or annul the distributive effects on un-
secured creditors came from both predictable sources and strange bedfellows. See
Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 8, at 899-900; Warren, supra note 16, at 323-25.
73 See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney,Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UC.C. Article 9: Reflections of the Reporters,
74 CHi.-KcNT L. REv. 1357, 1358-60 (1999) (suggesting a sensitivity on the part of the
Revised Article 9 Drafting Committee to the interests of unsecured creditors). Profes-
sorJanger provides an exceptional treatment of the events and discourse of the revi-
sion meetings. See generally Janger, supra note 2. In that article, he describes two
fundamental kinds of reform in the revision effort. One he characterizes as reform
aimed at "simplicity," the other at "safety." See id. at 573-74, Reforms of the first type
had in mind the ease and certainty with which secured creditors might go about their
business. For example, long-standing technical matters that have plagued the filing
system were addressed. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation
Should Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REv. 577,
593-619 (1995). It appears there was much consensus on those issues. Janger, supra
note 2, at 573. Not so, the issues and accompanying proposals concerning distributive
justice and the priority of secured creditors. Id.
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ownership as a collection of distinct, though homologous, 
rights or
interests-the celebrated "bundle of sticks.
74 It is that metaphor-
the favorite of the inspired notion that ownership 
can be frag-
mented-which allows the owning of nearly anything 
in bits and
pieces, for this period of time or that, whether 
the thing owned be
tangible or ethereal. 75 Fragmented ownership admits 
the ingenious
possibility that constituent ownership interests 
can part company to be
held in different hands at once, and that possibility 
allows the imagi-
native divorcement of possession and use, on the 
one hand, from its
value,7 6 on the other, as by mortgage or hypothecation.
77 So it is that
the use and enjoyment of an object of ownership may reside 
in the
74 The metaphor is familiar to every law student. 
Among the most renowned of
"sticks" is possession. The holder of this stick is entitled to continue 
in possession
against all but the "true owner," presumably a 
figure with more sticks. See R.H. Helm-
holz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case 
Law, 80 Nw. U. L. RE,.
1221, 1230 (1986). Under the common law, possession is, 
so to say, the origin or root
of property ownership. Carol M. Rose, Possession 
as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 73 (1985). An early sighting of the metaphor can be 
found in BENJAMIN N. CAR-
DOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 
129 (1928). For an unusual treatment of,
among other things, the bundle metaphor, see 
Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note
64.
75 Thus, possession can be divorced from other 
interests (e.g., the right to sue for
damages for injury to property). The notion of fragmented 
ownership likewise moti-
vates the prospect of ownership for specified 
intervals of time necessary to the con-
cepts associated with estates in land. See generally 
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A.
WHITMAN, THE LAw or PROPERTV §§ 2.1-.17 (3d ed. 2000) 
(discussing present and
future estates).
76 A second, ontological metaphor requires 
that value be understood as a thing,
so that it might be given, measured, and so 
forth. Once conceived of (metaphori-
cally) in that way, the metaphor can be elaborated, so 
that value can be transferred
away-conveyed-while other aspects of ownership 
remain in the hands of others.
See Knippenberg, supra note 15, at 1971-73; Ponoroff 
& Knippenberg, supra note 32,
at 314; see also Schroeder, Bundle-OStiX, supra 
note 64, at 239 n.2 (" [11n contemporary
legal discourse the most common conception 
of property is the bundle of legally pro-
tected interests, held together by competing 
and conflicting policy goals. The re-
moval of one or more sticks from the bundle 
should have no particular implications
for the legally protected interests that remain.").
77 We use the terms "mortgage" and "hypothecation" 
in a broad sense here, so as
to include not only real estate, but similar 
interests in personalty, both tangible and
intangible. Indeed, dividing ownership 
and isolating its member parts so that they
might lead independent economic lives 
enables far more than this. It means that 
the
places we occupy may not belong to us 
at all, that the things we use daily in our 
work
and home life are often not altogether 
ours exclusive of the ability of another 
to
successfully assert a claim to them. Ownership 
in part is central to every transaction
with any claim to sophistication or consequence 
beyond the absolutely fundamental.
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debtor, with its value detached and relocated in the secured
creditor.78
An inescapable imperative emerges from the metaphor of owner-
ship as a bundle of sticks or (the less whimsical) bundle of rights.
Once dealt out of the bundle, property rights cannot be dispensed
from the same bundle a second time. This ordinance finds expression
in the proverbial commercial law maxim, nemo dat quod habet. The
ruling on the matter is not arbitrary, but follows necessarily from un-
derstanding property according to the bundle metaphor. 79
On the coventional property-based account of security, the secur-
ity agreement is more deed than contract.8 0 The value stick passes out
of the bundle and into the coffers of the secured creditor, where it is
irreclaimably beyond the reach of unsecured creditors,8s both those
who voluntarily transacted with the debtor (e.g., trade creditors), and
those upon whom the claim was foisted (tort creditors).82 Since the
security interest is property, while the interests of unsecured creditors
are not, the value deeded away is gone. Thus ends any priority battle
between secured and unsecured creditors. If this is the beginning and
78 See Knippenberg, supra note 15, at 1972.
79 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing entailments and meta-
phoric mapping).
80 Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2051-52; see also Knippenberg, supra note
15, at 1972 (suggesting that the security agreement is a kind of deed because it is
more an instrument of conveyance than an instrument setting the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2287 (discussing the
consistency of the security interest with the conveyance metaphor, which allows for a
physical transfer of lien rights from the debtor to the creditor).
81 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2262.
82 This is the essence of Professor LoPucki's claim that security cannot be de-
centlyjustified. He submits that unsophisticated, unsecured creditors are ignorant of
the risks of secured credit, and so do not bargain meaningfully with the debtor who
has encumbered his assets. LoPucki, supra note 8, at 1916-20. Tort claimants, of
course, do not bargain with tortious debtors, nor do they have the opportunity to
decline to "transact" with the debtor from whom they seek recovery. See generally id. at
1896-1902 (noting that a substantial portion of unsecured debt of persons filing
bankruptcy was owed to "reluctant" creditors such as tort claimants). An early sight-
ing of the proposition that tort claimants should be awarded priority over secured
creditors can be found in Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the
Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 S-rAN. L. REv. 1045 (1984).
Others have followed, for example, Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All
Limited Liability Enterprises: Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U.
CIN. L, REV. 95 (2001); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,
91 COLUM. L. RE,. 1565 (1991). But see Knippenberg, supra note 15, at 1980-82 (ar-
guing that LoPucki's insistence on tort victim priority can be seen as a shift in man-
agement responsibility from the debtor to the secured creditor, which, while arguably
justified, must first be defended on some explicit normative basis).
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end of analysis, then the first-in-time priority rule that squeezes out
unsecured creditors is both inevitable and intractable.
The consequences that attend pronouncing the security interest
property are also the sum and substance of the so-called "property-
based defense" of security.8 On creation of the security interest,
value in the collateral is conveyed to the secured creditor such that it
is no longer accessible to other creditors seeking to satisfy their
claims. Prevailing outcome-required analysis premised on the extant
conveyance model and its chief feature, the principle of nemo dat, as-
sures the first-in-time priority rule that favors the secured creditor, but
there is more.
Starting from the implicit, but still unsubstantiated assumption
that the credit is good, the more the better, and that secured credit is
best, the proliferation of rules to enhance security became paramount
in the development of the commercial law over the past half-century.
For this to occur, creation and perfection of the security interest cer-
tainly had to be "facilitated."84 More to the point, however, the secur-
ity interest would be "property," bestowing it with a set of powerful
political and emotive associations, not to mention a commanding pri-
ority unique to property.85 Further, Article 9 would abstain from pro-
viding a definition of personal property and fixtures, the stuff to
which the security interest might attach, so that an endless parade of
83 See generally Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2025-37 (arguing that giving
security for debt neither harms nor increases the risk to a debtor's unsecured credi-
tors); Stephen J. Harris and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and
Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CoR
NELL L. REv. 1349, 1356-70 (1997) (arguing that subordinating secured credit to un-
secured claims would materially reduce the availability of credit to parties that need it
most such as distressed businesses). As noted earlier, security has been assailed both
on the grounds that it is inefficient in a macroeconomic sense, and simply unfair to
unsecured creditors. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Theodore Eisen-
berg, The Undersecured Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 VAND. L.
REv. 931, 953-55 (1985) (noting that a secured creditor's interest should be regarded
as no more than a priority claim limited to the value of the collateral).
84 See supra note 5 (noting the vision of the drafters of Article 9 was to make
secured credit cheap and easy). This was likewise the continuing (and expanded)
mission of the revision process. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The
Article 9 Study Committee Report: Strong Signals and Hard Choices, 29 IDAHO L. Rv. 561,
577-80 (1993) (discussing the recommendations made in the 1992 report of the
U.C.C. Permanent Editorial Board's Article 9 Study Committee, for which the authors
also served as reporters).
85 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text; see also infra note 109 and ac-
companying text (noting that security interests constitute prioritized property).
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newly emerging interests might become collateral, and, thereby, suc-
cumb to the secured party's property claim.86
As more interests are promoted to the status of "property," more
interests become available for hypothecation. The security interest-
conclusively understood to be property in those interests87-is
freighted with all the implications associated with property. 88 An ex-
panding list of collateral, in turn, invites more "cross-boundary" con-
flicts89 and further intrusion upon the status and interests of
unsecured creditors. 90 Because the interests of the latter are per-
ceived as less than property, however, they stand no chance in the
battle for assets with the perfected security interest. All conflicts are
86 The scope of Revised Article 9, like its predecessor, continues to reach any
transaction, regardless of form, that creates a consensual security interest in personal
property or fixtures, unless explicitly excluded from the article. U.C.C. § 9-
102(12) (B) (2006) and § 9-104 (1972); U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (2006) and § 9-102 (1972).
Although the basic scope of the rule remained intact, the revision expanded the
scope of Article 9 in several key respects, including the sale of most payment in-
tangibles (§ 9-109(a)(3)) and elimination of the exclusion for deposit accounts (de-
fined in § 9-102(a) (29)). Likewise, Revised Article 9 also covers sales of promissory
notes (defined in U.C.C. § 9-102 (a) (65)), largely included to facilitate securitization
of this type of instrument. Furthermore, the scope of Article 9 does reach some real
estate-like interests. Fixtures, as noted, have always been available as collateral (see
U.C.C. § 9-334), and obligations may be used as collateral though those obligations
might themselves be secured by real estate interests. U.C.C. § 9-109(b). In addition,
an Article 9 security interest can be taken in the non-Article 9 security device (mort-
gage or lien) that secures the obligation, provided the obligation and device are "cou-
pled." U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 7. At the same time, personal property is nowhere defined
in Article 9. Simply put, if a thing is not realty, it is personalty, and its value may be
conveyed in the form of a security interest.
87 Professor Schroeder makes the case that the drafters of the U.C.C., in disclaim-
ing the relevance of title and embracing, instead, the bundle of rights paradigm, re-
stated the antiquated relationship of property to things-property reified: "[The
legal realists rejected the notion of title, not because it was unitary or objective, but
precisely because it was insufficiently physical . . .They demanded that not only
goods-which are by definition physical things-but also acts and words must become
tangible." Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 64, at 310. Moreover, "[iln order to
make property tangible, the drafters identified property in the good with the good
itself. Property interests in the good are made, as nearly as possible, equivalent to
sensuous contact with the good." Id.
88 See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
89 See supra note 10.
90 See also LoPucki, supra note 11, at 18 ("The effect [of simplifying secured
credit] was to increase dramatically the proportion of encumbered assets in the Amer-
ican economy."). The impact of expanding secured credit was apparent in bank-
ruptcy liquidations where distribution to unsecured creditors was significantly
reduced. Id.
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resolved ipso facto in favor of the secured claim, save 
for the precious
few circumstances where Article 9 deigns to command 
otherwise.9 1
If secured credit is a thing to be encouraged, it would 
seem the
expansion of security accomplished under the revision 
of Article 9
amounts to felicitous progress about which there 
should be much re-
joicing. On that view, the expansion of security would be something
akin to the development of a modern economy, 
with its costs to be
born by dilution of what are regarded as tangential 
interests necessa-
rily crowded out in the process.
92 But there are insidious differences
to be noted as well.
First, the institution of secured credit does not await 
an emerging
interest to be declared property by any authority 
external to Article 9
itself. This is assured, in part, by the lack of definition 
of personalty.9
On the bundle of rights conception, value is but 
one stick extracted
from the bundle that constitutes property ownership, 
such that the
object of the security interest from which the value has been conveyed
must, by definition, itself be property.
94 The conceptual imperialism
of the property metaphor, confirmed and reiterated 
in the revision
process, thus effectively endows Article 9 itself with 
the capacity to de-
termine what interests might be called property.
Next, the prevailing ideation of the security interest 
enjoys a
Blackstonian-like conceptualization of property.
95 That paradigm,
however, in the world of real property in which 
it developed, necessa-
rily involved conflict when competing interests 
collided,9 6 as well as
attendant rules and limitations to resolve such 
conflicts in a manner
that accommodated those interests. In a world 
where conflicts do not
arise, or are summarily dismissed in most cases,
97 it is possible to en-
tertain a definition that awards the security interest 
a status of prop-
erty amounting to absolute dominion.
98 The point to be made is that
91 The basic priority rule in U.C.C. § 9-201(a) (2006) confers 
a blanket priority
on the secured claim over essentially the whole 
world. The balance of the specific
priority rules in subpart 3 of Part III of Article 
9 then operate as exceptions to the
general rule, including the occasional elevation 
of nonsecured claimants, as in the
case of certain non-Article 9 liens arising by operation 
of law. U.C.C. § 9-333.
92 See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
93 See supra text accompanying note 86.
94 See supra note 76.
95 See infia notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 91.
98 Where neighboring property owners undertake 
no activities which intrude on
the absolute dominion of the other, no conflict 
arises. Absent cross-boundary con-
flicts, it matters little whether both are regarded 
as enjoying absolute dominion and
the attendant freedom from interference that 
is implied. See also infra notes 136-38
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where the interests of unsecured creditors are not dignified with the
classification "property," there are no cross-boundary conflicts that are
not instantly resolved simply because security is property and the com-
peting unsecured interest is not.
Finally, cross-border conflicts would be avoided in the realm of
secured credit whether or not the rights and interests of unsecured
creditors were regarded as property. Although enshrined with the
paramount rights of real property, the security interest is not an inter-
est in land. Thus, with its first-in-time priority, it has heretofore been
insulated from scrutiny as a nuisance even of the watered-down variety
that emerged with the shift to the modern economy.99 In sum, the
security interest as property, unlike a property interest in land, has no
natural enemies. In this, the security interest is property of a special
and exalted sort, presenting a singular example of eating one's cake
and having it to boot.
D. Nemo Dat Gone Mad: Security as a Judgment-Proofing Strategy
Where a debtor either has no assets, or has assets inaccessible to
judgment creditors through execution, that debtor is effectively judg-
ment proof.100 There are several strategies by which a debtor may be
rendered judgment proof, including secured credit, the most an-
cient-if no longer the most common-method. 10 1 Under that strat-
egy, the debtor issues debt secured by a pervasive lien on its assets in
an amount that immediately or seasonably thereafter exceeds the liq-
uidation value of the encumbered assets, which thus become instantly
inaccessible to unsecured creditors, certainly those without judgments
and even those whose claims have been reduced to judgment. Now,
with no further risks to be incurred, and all external discipline dissi-
pated, the fun begins. 10 2
and accompanying text (discussing the concept of absolute dominion in the context
of indirect invasion).
99 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
100 LoPucki, supra note 11, at 1 n.4. "The liability system works solely through the
entry and enforcement of money judgments. Debtors can defeat it by rendering
themselves judgment proof." Id. at 14.
101 LoPucki identifies and describes four judgment-proofing strategies: secured
debt strategies, ownership strategies (by shuffling assets to subsidiaries or through
asset securitization), exemption strategies, and foreign haven strategies. Id. at 14-38.
More recently, "on-shore" havens might be added to the list. See John K. Eason, Home
from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives Impact Traditional Estate and
Gift Tax Planning, 52 FLA. L. REV. 41, 53-63 (2000).
102 See Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 45,
47-54 (1986) (discussing the suboptimal incentives in terms of exercising ordinary
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Recent years have witnessed the emergence of 
a lively debate
among academic commentators regarding the limits 
of liability-limit-
ing techniques, or, more colorfully stated, about a 
phenomenon that
has come to bear the moniker "judgment-proofng..O0 While 
judg-
ment-proofing strategies are not by any means confined 
to the ability
under Article 9 to subordinate unsecured 
claims to secured debt,1
0 4
clearly the ability under Article 9, as revised, for 
creditors to engage in
broad all-asset lending has contributed to the 
concern.'
0 5 The cur-
rent regime allows corporate borrowers and their 
secured lenders to
care, purchasing liability insurance, etc., that occur 
once debtors have effectively judg-
ment-proofed themselves).
103 For a sampling of the debate, see LoPucki, 
supra note 11, 14-19; Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 147, 149-50
(1998) (suggesting that by creating judgment-proof structures, 
creditors lose the prac-
tical ability, albeit not the legal right, to enforce 
their claims); Schwarcz, supra note
11, at 17-28 (1999) (suggesting that LoPucki is wrong 
because economic analysis
makes it irrational for arms-length business transactions 
to be used asjudgment-proof-
ing schema); White, supra note 11, at 1371-74 (arguing 
based on empirical analysis
that LoPucki is wrong because the percentage 
of companies' assets hypothecated to
secured debt has not been increasing). There has also been 
a rich literature devoted,
if not to judgment-proofing per se, then to the related issue 
of imposing limits on
limited liability, particularly with respect to tort 
claims, in order to create appropriate
investment incentives and to reduce cost externalization. 
See, e.g., Leebron, supra
note 82; Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach 
to Shareholder Liability for Corpo-
rate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (2002); Henry Nasmann 
& Reiner Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 
YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
104 See supra note 101. For an overview of the 
mechanics of asset securitization, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, I 
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133
(1994).
105 While beyond the scope of this Article-the 
nuisance metaphor may be an
equally suitable way of thinking about challenging 
judgment-proofing mechanisms in
these other contexts as well, such as securitization 
transactions, on the basis that trans-
fer of the securitized assets to the bankruptcy 
remote subsidiary is a misuse of prop-
erty, thus enhancing the case for recharacterizing 
the transfer as either a loan or a
fraudulent conveyance. See generally David Gray 
Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of
Securitization, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1111-12 
(1998) (maintaining that Bank-
ruptcy Code policy favors treating securitized 
assets in the same fashion as secured
loans). Although not binding necessarily in a federal 
bankruptcy proceeding, an-
other important goal in the revision of Article 
9 was to expand protection for and to
facilitate securitization transactions. See Steven 
L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitiza-
tion of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 947, 953-55 
(1999) (discussing the
ways in which Article 9 attempts to make the 
perfection process clearer and more
practical); see also Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 
25 CARDOZO L. REv.
1759, 1761 (2004) (citing recently adopted statutes that have 
"gerrymander[ed] state
property law to provide a safe harbor for securitization 
transactions" and that provide
an effective opt-out from Article 9).
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externalize virtually all of the costs of insolvency. 10 6 This is most obvi-
ous in, but not necessarily limited to, the case of tort liability.10 7 Exac-
erbated by the divergent motivations that sometimes emerge from the
separation of ownership and management, t01 Article 9 arguably facili-
tates the extension of more credit than is optimal, at least from the
perspective of distributional fairness. The statute's embracement of
full priority, and the concomitant subordination of unsecured claims,
makes this a logical but, as we hope to show, not a necessary, result.
In its present form, secured credit is manifestly an ideal construct
by which to judgment-proof debtors. The hegemony of the convey-
ance model, and the corresponding principle of nemo dat, together,
ensure priority for perfected secured creditors as surely and inexora-
bly as night follows day. In other words, in the grand scheme of
things, the property-based tenets on which security has come to be
106 See Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 8, at 899-900 (explaining that the full prior-
ity for secured claims, when combined with the distortions already created by limited
liability, leads firms "to underinvest in precautions and overinvest in risky activities
that externalize harm to other parties").
107 G. Eric Brunsted, Bankruptcy and the Problems of Economic Futility: A Theory on the
Unique Role of Bankruptcy Law, 55 Bus. LAW. 499, 539 (2000) (suggesting that a firm's
inability to pay unsecured claims is more detrimental to tort victims than trade credi-
tors); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 431 (2000) ("Tort victims have no control over the type of legal
entity that injures them. Consequently, to make the amount recovered by a tort vic-
tim depend upon the legal form of the organization responsible for the tort is to
permit the externalization of accident costs, and indeed to invite the choice of legal
entity to be governed in important part by the desire to seek such externalization.");
Charles W. Hendricks, Offering Tort Victims Some Solace: Why States Should Incorporate a
20% Set-Aside Into Their Versions of Article 9, 104 COM. LJ. 265, 268-71 (1999) (urging
adoption by the states of the Warren "carve-out" proposal); Janger, supra note 2, at
606 (pointing out that the availability of secured credit, when coupled with limited
liability, could seriously erode the effectiveness of the tort liability system); Note,
Switching Priorities: Elevating The Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of Optimal
Deterrence, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2541, 2561-62 (2003) (making the case that the elevation
of tort claims in bankruptcy would alleviate the externalization of liability in both
liquidations and reorganizations).
108 See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 568 (2003) (pointing out that shareholders of
public companies are not in a position, legally or practically, to monitor and regulate
the decisions of the day-to-day managers of the firm); Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging
the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 441, 484-86 (1994) (discussing the sometimes
incongruent interests of owners and professional managers in relation to initiation of
bankruptcy). For a more general discussion of the agency problems inherent in the
divergent interests of corporate managers and shareholders, see Elizabeth Chorvat,
You Can't Take it With You: Behavioral Finance and Corporate Expatriations, 37 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 453, 485-87 (2003).
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understood create systematic opportunities, if not actual incentives,
for judgment-proofing.
Indeed, judgment-proofing through secured credit is simply the
outcome of the ordinary operation of priority rules based on property
ownership. Secured creditors have an ownership interest in the
debtor's assets because the security is denominated to be "property,"
while judgment and other unsecured creditors own no property.
Thus, the priority battle is over before it is pitched. 10 9
III. Sic UTERE Tuo, UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS
While there is, and has been, much criticism of the priority
awarded secured credit,110 none, so far as we are aware, has proposed
a rubric by which misuse of security might be arrested other than by
challenging the basic precepts of the conveyance model-an exercise
of interesting intellectual interest, but no more likely to have a practi-
cal effect than a knight on horseback is likely to do damage to a wind-
mill by charging it with a lance. In this Part, therefore, we propose a
rubric for redressing the use of security as a judgment-proofing
scheme that operates squarely within the boundaries of the property
model.
The approach we advance is suggested by the very decree that has
declared security to be property, as emphatically confirmed in Revised
Article 9. That is, with property rights come property responsibilities.
In the law relating to real property, the very law that has come to
structure the contemporary understanding of Article 9, one way in
which property responsibility is imposed is through the law of nui-
sance, a tort that polices unreasonable uses of land. It is our belief
that the doctrine of nuisance similarly offers a workable and concep-
tually compatible model for policing the misuse of security. To ex-
plore this possibility, an excursus into the law of nuisance is in order
as follows.
Nuisance law' is rooted in profoundly held convictions about a
landowner's unqualified right to prevent physical intrusion upon his
109 In fact, we think it inaccurate to refer to a "priority dispute" in this context at
all, as we believe that phrase implies the ordering of distribution among like claim-
ants. Secured creditors own the collateral; judgment creditors have no cognizable
property, so there is no real dispute about priority that can in fact arise between them.
110 See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
111 The word, nuisance, has its etymology in the Latin, nocumentum, from which it
found its way to become the French, nuisant, the present participle of nuire, which
means "[t]o be hurtful, injurious, or prejudicial ... to jeopardize, to harm; to stand in
the way, to be an obstacle or hindrance." THE NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY 516
(1962); seeJeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and
2oo6]
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land. 1 2 Nuisance, that is to say, has its origins in the law 
of tres-
pass.1 13 As a cause of action, private nuisance 
has been something of a
utility player, called upon to right wrongs against property 
and prop-
erty-like rights where redress cannot 
neatly be had otherwise." 
4
While the law of nuisance is far from elegant conceptually,
1 15 its evolu-
tion, and the historical context of that evolution, 
are observable and
revealing for present purposes.
The prototype of the conceptual category "trespass"-of 
which
nuisance is a theoretical offspring-is the unprivileged 
entry in the
Future, 54 ALB. L. REv. 189, 192 (1990) (citing W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 617 n.7 (5th ed. 1984)).
112 "The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance 
to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the 
wind may blow through it-the
storm may enter; but the King of England cannot 
enter!" William Pitt, Earl of Chat-
ham, Speech on the Excise Bill Before the House 
of Commons (Mar. 1763) in Ox-
FORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 515, 515 (4th ed. 1992); 
see also WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *3 (private property entails 
the prerogative of "total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe").
113 Private and public nuisance share the name 
"nuisance," but their heritage is
quite different. Private nuisance, as noted in the 
text, has its lineage in the law of
trespass and is aimed at the protection of interests related 
to land, if, in some cases,
those interests seem far removed from what are by consensus 
property interests (e.g.,
.use and enjoyment"). See KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 87, at 618. Private nui-
sance, then, is a civil wrong, a tort. Public nuisance 
was a parallel development, but
distinct from private nuisance: public nuisance was 
a crime against the crown. Id. at
617. At the same time, the same acts constituting 
a public nuisance and so a crime
may likewise constitute a private nuisance giving 
rise to a civil remedy in tort. Moreo-
ver, private individuals may seek a civil remedy 
in tort for public nuisance. Id. at
617-18. The result is a conflation of the two concepts 
at the margins, such that the
difference in the two, as a practical matter, may only 
be one of degree. That is, pri-
vate nuisance affects one or few, while public nuisance 
impacts greater numbers of
the public. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, 
§ 7.2, at 417-18. For an extended
discussion of public nuisance, see Denise E. Antolini, 
Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solv-
ing the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755 
(2001).
114 KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 616 ("[Nuisance] 
has meant all things to all
people, and has been applied indiscriminately to 
everything from an alarming adver-
tisement to a cockroach baked in a pie." (footnotes omitted)). 
For a compilation of
commentary on the meaninglessness of the term "nuisance," 
see Jeremiah Smith,
Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 
109-12 (1921).
115 Justice Blackmun complained that nuisance 
law was altogether unprincipled.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1055 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Common law nuisance has also been 
variously referred to as a "garbage 
can,"
William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. 
L. REV. 399, 410 (1942), and a
"mongrel." F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REv. 480, 480 (1949).
While not particularly flattering appellations, the 
malleable and ill-defined perimeters
of nuisance doctrine make it ideal for adaptation 
and, ergo, for our purposes.
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person of the trespasser," 6 but entry in the form of some tangible
thing wielded by or under the trespasser's control will do. 1 7 Both
constitute physical invasion by the trespasser, one directly and one
indirectly.118
At a certain point, one strays from the prototype category mem-
ber (physical entry of the trespasser) altogether into the derivative cat-
egory "nuisance."1 9 In conventional terms, trespass is distinguished
from nuisance in that the former involves physical intrusion, while the
latter does not.120 The conceptual demarcation is quite distinct, even
if the boundary often blurs owing to a seemingly crude distinction
that conceives of large objects as instruments of trespass, but small
116 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 411. Originally, the distinction
between trespass and nuisance turned on the characterization of the physical intru-
sion as direct or indirect. Direct invasion constituted trespass, while indirect invasion
constituted nuisance. The characterization was necessitated by the old forms of ac-
tion. Trespass was the appropriate action for direct physical invasion, but offered no
remedy for indirect physical invasion, which, instead, was left to an action on the case.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 622. The distinction between direct and indirect
invasion atrophied with the disappearance of the old forms of action. Id. The differ-
ence between the torts thereafter was cast in terms of the nature of the interest to be
protected. Trespass disturbed exclusive possession of land, while nuisance was an af-
front to its use and enjoyment. Id.
117 "Instrumentalities that can cause trespass are generally objects . .. that have
size and weight, whereas nuisances are generally caused by 'nonphysical' forces such
as noise, odors, and vibration." STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 412; see
also KEFTON ET AL., supra note 111, at 619-20 (defining nuisance as "an interference
with the use and enjoyment of the land" and providing examples of the "different
ways and combinations of ways" in which this interest may be invaded).
118 Another important imaginative device of rationality is metonymy. Whereas
metaphor is a matter of understanding one concept or entity in terms of another con-
cept, metonymic reasoning entails one entity standing for another. In the expression,
"all hands on deck," for instance, the hand stands for the whole sailor. LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 35-40. In the same way, unprivileged entry in the form of
objects, projectiles, wandering animals, and so forth under the indirect trespasser's
control constitute trespass. See SToEBuCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 411 and
accompanying notes.
119 This is not intended as a casual use of the term, "category," rather, we use it in
the experientialist sense. On the experientialist account, categories are conceptual,
as distinguished from the common objectivist view of categories as naturally occur-
ring, independent of human conceptual categories. LAKOFF, supra note 19, at 266-68.
For the objectivist, by contrast, categories are defined by the inherent properties of
their members and are mind-independent. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying
text.
120 See supra note 116.
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objects as nuisance-creating agents. 121 Much turns on whether the ob-
ject or objects are visible to the naked eye.' 22
If the agents of nuisance, unlike trespass, do not disturb posses-
sion, private nuisance is nevertheless a tort against interests initially
associated with property ownership. 12 3 Traditionally, the interest in-
vaded has been deemed to be the "use and enjoyment" of the land by
the possessor; 124 although providing a workable definition of "use and
enjoyment" 125 (and particularly to do so in terms of property1 26) has
proved to be a challenge. The point to be taken is that the parame-
ters of common law nuisance are not especially well delineated in ap-
121 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.1, at 412. The distinction be-
tween nuisance and trespass based on the size of the instrumentality involved may
seem arbitrary or frivolous at first glance; however, on understanding nuisance and
trespass as conceptual categories, it becomes perfectly sensible. The prototype of the
conceptual category "trespass" is physical intrusion of the trespasser's person. Id.
§ 7.1, at 411. The metaphor, "objects are extensions of the person manipulating
them," admits direct physical intrusion in the form of some instrumentality wielded
by the trespasser into the category, trespass. Intrusion in the form of objects with
insignificant mass is too remote from the central category prototype for category
membership.
122 Dust, insects, and even smoke occupy physical space and have substance, how-
ever inconsequential, hut these are generally regarded as nuisance-causing agents,
not instruments of trespass. KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 71.
123 Ownership interests protected from private nuisance include interests less than
fee absolute ownership. For instance, tenants for a term, mortgagors in possession
after a foreclosure, even those in adverse possession enjoy interests recognized as pro-
tected from nuisance. Id. at 621.
124 This does not, however, define public nuisance, which requires no injury to
real property; instead, public nuisance and private actions for public nuisance arise
on injury to public rights, though such rights might include an injury to real property.
See generally Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV.
89, 96 (1998) ("The public nuisance action stems from the injury a private use inflicts
on public rights, which may occasionally mean harm to real property owned by the
public, but is more often an injury to common pool resources .
125 According to the Second Restatement of Torts:
"Interest in use and enjoyment" also comprehends the pleasure, comfort
and enjoyment that a person normally derives from the occupancy of land.
Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using land is often as impor-
tant to a person as freedom from physical interruption with his use or free-
dom from detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b (1979).
126 STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 7.2, at 416 ("How should we define the
property interest that the law of nuisance protects? Is it necessary to say that the
plaintiff has a specifically defined property interest in light, air, and view, as discrete
kinds of 'property,' or should we define the protected property interest more broadly
as use and enjoyment of the land?").
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plication.1 27 The formula for stating the action, however, is quite
clear,' 28 and, more important for present purposes, there is little con-
fusion about the essence of nuisance law, which is to address uses of
property that injure the interests of another or a community of others.
The conceptual history of nuisance law begins with the Black-
stonian conception of property.129 It corresponds roughly to contem-
porary popularly held conceptions of property,130 which equate
property to things, land, or personalty, actually owned.'31 This concep-
tion has, however, always been inadequate for law, which generally
regards property as describing a relationship between the owner and
the things themselves. In other words, things are not property, rather,
things are merely the subjects of property. 3 2
In any case, Blackstone described property to be "sole and des-
potic dominion whicl one man claims and exercises over external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individ-
127 KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 549-50.
128 According to the Restatement, "[a] private nuisance is a non-trespassory inva-
sion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). First, there must be some intentional conduct
that amounts to interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Id. § 822.
The phrase "interest in the use and enjoyment of land" is used ... [by the)
Restatement in a broad sense. It comprehends not only the interests that a
person may have in the actual present use of land for residential, agricul-
tural, commercial, industrial and other purposes, but also his interests in
having the present use value of the land unimpaired by changes in its physi-
cal condition.
Id. § 821D cmt. b. Second, there must, indeed, be a resulting interference from that
conduct. Id. § 821F. Third, the interference must result in harm (significantly, the
requirement is satisfied on showing a devaluation of the nuisance victim's property).
Id. § 826. Finally, the interference must be unreasonable. Id.
129 See supra text accompanying note 95.
130 BRUCE A. AcRmAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-100, 113-67
(1977). This is the lay notion of property ownership as dominion over things.
131 See, e.g., Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in the Law, 86 U.
PA. L. REv. 691, 691 (1938) ("A layman thinks of property as a man's belongings, or as
the things that a man owns."). The fact is, the 'layman" conceives of property in terms
of objects or things not because the layman is insipid, but because that conception is
perfectly serviceable for the layman's purposes. Id. at 694-95. One might spend a
highly successful lifetime acting in every regard on a concept of the universe that
supposes the sun revolves around the earth like a ball on a string. In the course of the
day for most of us, that conception is as serviceable as any other. A different concep-
tualization is required only when the other fails to accommodate the endeavor at
hand. See id. at 696 ("Changing culture causes the law to speak with new imperatives,
invigorates some concepts, devitalizes and brings to obsolescence others,").
132 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 75, § 1.1, at 1.
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ual . .,l Blackstonian notions of unitary ownership of land, with
all of its domineering political associations, implied an equally potent
corollary: "[A]bsolute dominion.. . conferred on an owner the power
to prevent any use of his neighbor's land that conflicted with his own
quiet enjoyment."' 34 Of course, stated in the negative, the same prin-
ciple meant circumscribing the rights of owners to develop or use
their land in contradiction of the principle of absolute dominion.,3 5
In an economy centered on land ownership, that contradiction
presented relatively few actual conflicts. 13 6 Direct invasion was dealt
with by trespass, and obnoxious uses short of invasion that interfered
with quiet enjoyment were circumscribed as nuisances.' 37 Nine-
teenth-century economic developments, however, meant novel and
expanding uses of land that began to produce more nettlesome con-
flicts. 138 Gradually, the contradiction between corresponding rights
and obligations of property ownership was not only exposed, but
brought to highly problematic relief. The indirect invasion that nec-
essarily attended novel uses were, of course, instantly met with the law
of nuisance, which proscribed strictly any interference with use and
enjoyment. Strict liability for nuisance meant the costs of remedying
133 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 112, at *2.
134 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
31 (1997) (footnotes omitted). For Blackstone, property owners had to desist from
even lawful uses that offended the use and enjoyment of neighboring owners, upon
whom "it is incumbent ... to find some other place to do that act, where it will be less
offensive." Id. (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 112, at *217-18). According to
Vandevelde, the two essential components of Blackstone's conception were the pres-
ence of a physical thing, which might be the object of property, and the notion that
ownership of that thing was exclusive and absolute. Vandevelde, supra note 25, at
331.
135 It is a matter of the "entitlement to make noise versus the entitlement to have
silence, the entidement to pollute versus the entitlement to breathe clean air." Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1972).
136 See Halper, supra note 124, at 101 ("While there may be cross-boundary annoy-
ances, in an agrarian economy, where land is wealth, not many land uses conflict.
Those that do can be subjected to an 'act at your peril' rule of strict liability, without
much damage to the economy." (footnotes omitted)).
137 Id. at 100.
138 As professor Halper explains:
[N]ew kinds of active uses, dynamic, voracious and large-scale, came to swal-
low up land and people. Those uses often, virtually always, conflicted with
the old ones. They involved speed and machinery and emissions and smells
and discharges and noise and steam and the plethora of other "less salubri-
ous consequences" of industrial and extractive enterprises.
Id. at 101 (footnotes omitted).
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the injury had to be internalized in derogation of profits, and 
so also
in derogation of development.
1
-
9
It quickly became apparent that common law nuisance 
doctrine
was antithetical to late nineteenth-century industrial 
growth and ex-
pansion.1 40 The prognosis for nuisance was clear-to 
begin with,
strict liability had to go
1 41 and negligence would, to some degree, take
is place. 142
What, then, of nuisance as a symbol of egalitarian 
creed-the
idea that property is "qualitatively identical 
among property owners
regardless of the owner's birth, character, 
wealth, creed or ideol-
ogy. ., ,?'43 The erosion of nuisance entailed 
a simultaneous erosion
of the sacred institution of property, and so threatened 
the egalitarian
ideology it signified. While courts were unwilling 
to go so far as to
139 Id. at 103; see also David Abraham, Liberty 
and Property: Lord Bramwell and the
Political Economy of Liberal Jurisprudence, Individualism, Freedom, 
and Utility, 38 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 288, 297-98 (1994) (describing strict liability 
as essentially a dead weight
on industrial development).
140 In short, utilitarian principles would prevail 
through one means or another.
Essentially, solitary or small-scale landholders 
asserting their Blackstonian ownership
in an endeavor to halt offensive neighboring 
uses were either denied recovery or
limited to damages. The cost of maintaining 
the Blackstonian notion of absolute do-
minion, to include freedom from offensive 
uses by one's neighbor, was too high.
That is to say, large-scale, economically attractive 
activities reasonably conducted
would not, in the end, be compelled to internalize 
the cost of preserving Blackstonian
property concepts. The late-eighteenth-century 
Mill Acts dramatically illustrate the
point. HOROWITZ, supra note 134, at 47-53. 
To encourage the building of mills, a
number of states passed acts that foreclosed trespass 
and nuisance to landowners com-
plaining of their lands being flooded by neighboring 
mills. Id. at 47-48. Generally,
these acts would effectively eliminate the customary 
action for trespass and nuisance:
punitive damages, permanent injunction, and self-help abatement. 
Id. at 48. The
Mill Acts represent "some of the earliest illustrations 
of American willingness to sacri-
fice the sanctity of private property in the interest 
of promoting economic develop-
ment." Id. at 47.
141 The impact on development from nuisance 
doctrine was also ameliorated by
denying injunctive relief in favor of damages. The remedy was 
determined by balanc-
ing the equities, i.e., balancing the harm to the 
complaining party as against the social
utility of the injury-causing activity. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, 
supra note 75, § 7.2, at
418-19. This was the "American Rule" from 
early on. Halper, supra note 124, at
109-13.
142 See Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and 
Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance
Law: 1830 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1101, 1139 
(1986) ("To mid-nineteenth-century
conceptualists, negligence-based nuisance doctrine 
held out the hope of assimilating
nuisance law to the prevailing fault theory of 
tort liability. The doctrine imposed
liability for most land uses only if the defendant 
negligently conducted the use.").
Deficiencies in negligence-based nuisance doctrine, 
however, prevented it from be-
coming firmly entrenched in nuisance law. Id. at 
1146.
143 Halper, supra note 124, at 104.
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deprive nuisance doctrine of its property heritage, 144 nevertheless the
conception of property as connoting absolute dominion, compre-
hending freedom from offending uses by neighboring property own-
ers, was simply incompatible with industrial development.
The transformation from agrarian to industrial economy also saw
erosion of the political and economic importance of solitary owner-
ship of land. Unitary ownership of anything was exploded into frag-
mented rights and relations by Hohfeld 1 45 These could be divided
and subdivided, distributed and redistributed, or "even made to disap-
pear as if by magic .... 46
Moreover, the very definition of property, theretofore securely
anchored in inherited associations with land or other things, was
forced from its object-ownership moorings.147 The legal category
"property" was suddenly pressed into service to govern an array of in-
corporeal rights and interests which supplanted land in economic sig-
nificance in an industrial, capitalistic economy.' 48 The universe of
property expanded enormously to the degree that some observers
144 See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con-
straints, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 74 (1979) (discussing the weakness of utilitarian consid-
erations in failing to explicitly recognize antecedent or natural rights that the law was
not called upon to create).
145 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning II, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND
OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 65, 67 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923). It might be more accurate to
say Hohfeld chronicled the explosion rather than precipitated it. Professor Jeanne
Schroeder, who offers an extended treatment of the bundle of sticks metaphor, de-
clares that on unveiling his bundle analysis, Hohfeld wrote the epitaph commemorat-
ing the already dead "ancestral" concept of property. Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra
note 64, at 239-40. Hohfeld's familiar recharacterization of property as a set of legal
relations, together with A.M. Honore's contributions to the bundle of rights model,
are analyzed and critiqued in J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43
UCLA L. REv. 711 (1996).
146 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY, 69,
69-70 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
147 See also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 531, 536 (2005) (discussing early, value-based views on property and the ab-
sence of such views from modern theory).
148 These are the "capitalized assets" that are the hallmark of a modern industrial
market-stock ownership, copyrights, patents, good will and the like. Morris R. Co-
hen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REv. 8, 12 (1927). Grey observes:
The transformation of a preindustrial economy of private proprietors
into an industrial economy ... presupposes that the entrepreneurs, finan-
ciers, and lawyers who carry the process through have the imagination to
liberate themselves from the imprisoning concept of property as the simple
ownership of a thing by an individual person. They must be able to design
new forms of finance and control for enterprise, which can take maximum
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predicted that virtually every interest or right threatened to lay claim
to that status, diluting the concept to the point of meaninglessness.' 4 -1
The emergent bundle metaphor defined property without con-
ceptual reference to unitary control and dominion over things. It de-
scribed a set of self-sufficient rights and usages no different, perhaps,
from other legal rights. When property law principles are indistin-
guishable from those of other doctrinal systems, it seems to deprive
property of the status of a distinct legal category.
The perceived disintegration of property into a bundle of sticks,
with its potential for fragmented ownership, might also be said to
render the general concept of ownership meaningless. Where sticks
are held by several, who is the owner? What is more, if the concept of
property requires no reference to a physical thing owned, the way is
clear to declare anything of value to be property. Then again, if every-
thing is property or can be the subject of property, then, perhaps
nothing is property and property ceases to be an important legal
category.1 50
However that may be, the report of the death of property was
premature.15' As a legal category, property has by no means lost its
power to decide disputes and it does so with mundane regularity. The
oppressive property priority awarded secured claims offers a stunning
example. Under a proposition-based program which resolves legal is-
advantage of ... forms that fractionate traditional ownership and that create
claims remote from tangible objects.
Grey, supra note 146, at 75-76.
149 "The protection of value rather than things ... greatly broadened the purview
of property law. Any valuable interest potentially could be declared the object of
property rights. This . . . was a development that threatened to place the entire
corpus of American law in the category of property." Vandevelde, supra note 25, at
329.
150 In Thomas Grey's words, "w~e have gone... in less than two centuries, from a
world in which property was a central idea mirroring a clearly understood institution
to one in which it is no longer a coherent or crucial category in our conceptual
scheme. The concept of property and the institution of property have disintegrated."
Grey, supra note 146, at 74.
151 "[P]roperty as an economic and legal practice continues to flourish. Property
concepts have not come crashing down in the face of this arcane, arid, and acontex-
tual legal argument. The Hohfeldian approach refuses to analyze contemporary prop-
erty qua property on the grounds that property is dead as an analytical category. The
marketplace, however, needs to account for property and continues to build the pro-
tective belt of auxiliaries." Schroeder, Bundle-O-Stix, supra note 64, at 300; see also Bell
& Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 531 (suggesting that the "bundle of sticks" meta-
phor is obsolete and proposing a unified theory of property predicated on the insight
that property law is organized around creating and defending the value inherent in
stable ownership).
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sues by recourse to conventional categories, to designate an interest
property is not a thing to be taken lightly. 152
Likewise, then, nuisance doctrine remains intact as well. To be
sure, breasting the winds of changing conceptions of property cer-
tainly left a different nuisance doctrine than that which absolutely
protected land ownership. But if the right to use and enjoyment of
property without interference no longer enjoys its former absolute do-
minion and glory, nuisance remains a property watchdog and its ap-
plication to security conceived as property is where we turn attention
next.
IV. NuISANCE DOCTRINE AS A RUBRIC TO CONSTRAIN THE MISUSE OF
SECURED CREDIT-PUTFING A STOP TO JUDGMENT-PROOFING
For present purposes, we are neither challenging the prevailing
property model nor proposing an alternative conceptualization of se-
curity. t 53 What we would argue is only that if all of the dimensions of
the now accepted source concept "property" are imprinted on the tar-
get concept "security," there is ample justification to warrant limiting
the secured creditor's legal rights (and remedies) when the exercise
of those rights, understood as property rights, interfere unreasonably
with the competing rights of a community of others-that is to say,
when the security interest becomes a nuisance. Put another way, the
rights of secured creditors as property owners should not exceed unqual-
ifiedly the rights of other property owners in the fashion that the pri-
ority rules of Article 9, operating in isolation, would demand.
As we have pointed out in the previous Part, the protection of
property rights, while expansive, is not absolute. In the real property
context, when the use of one's property interferes with the reasonable
enjoyment of adjacent property, nuisance law can be invoked to con-
strain the offending use (i.e., to limit the otherwise unfettered rights
152 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
153 This is something we have, however, done in the past, at least in the context of
a bankruptcy proceeding. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2289-96.
Once it is recognized that the security interest is not a thing that is property, but rather
represents a dynamic relationship that for some purposes we have come to under-
stand conceptually through the prism of the property metaphor, we (and more im-
portantly courts) are no longer consigned irrevocably to understand the security
interest as property, with all of the entailments associated with that concept, for all
purposes. In essence, then, we are freed to bring to bear competing conceptualiza-
tions that more accurately, and more fairly, characterize the relationship between the
debtor, the secured party, and others with a cognizable economic stake in that rela-
tionship. Although a tantalizing prospect, our assertion in this Article is far less in-
trepid than that.
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of ownership). Analogically, the same methodology cannot 
only be
applied to an Article 9 property interest, but we would 
maintain needs
to be so employed in order to reconcile appropriately 
these rights
with the rights of other claimants in and to the same 
property. Thus,
the question becomes when does the Article 9 
security interest, and
the benefits of the prioritization entitlements 
it enjoys, impinge on
other interests in the credit community to the 
point that the security
interest becomes a nuisance from the broader 
perspective of aggre-
gate social utility? In other words, to say that 
secured credit is benefi-
cial to the well being of the commercial order 
is meaningless unless
and until the limits on the truth of that assertion 
are explored.
The ideation of security as property in Article 
9 did not render
wholly irrelevant the application of other, non-Code doctrines, 
which,
proceeding from the property model, might be 
pressed into service to
alter this result in extraordinary cases. There 
is, further, a pragmatic
as well as a normative value in harmonizing application 
of these doc-
trines with the concept of the security interest 
as property, and it is
here that we believe the nuisance metaphor-itself 
a species of prop-
erty law-may have something to say that is not 
only consonant with
the prevailing positive law abstraction of security 
as property, but actu-
ally flows directly from it at the core conceptual 
level.
We make no claim that judgment-proofing amounts to nuisance
in the conventional sense. In addition, we advocate 
neither the ex-
pansion of the tort of nuisance generally to embrace 
injury to intangi-
ble interests in specific personalty by analogy, 
nor otherwise
recommend the creation of a cause of action to 
limit use of personal
property, including security in all cases. Rather, 
we believe simply that
certain misuses of security, including most 
notably judgment-proof-
ing, belong in the conceptual category nuisance. 
We further maintain
that there are good historical and contemporary 
reasons to put it
there.15 4 Judgment-proofing has been indicted 
in the literature which
describes its costs. 1 5 What we offer here is a 
conceptual redux that
assembles and restates those costs in a few recognizable, 
doctrinally
stipulated terms.
The experiment contributes to the discourse in two 
ways: First,
the threats posed by judgment-proofing are gathered under 
relatively
determinate markers that elicit widely familiar 
associations. 156 Sec-
154 See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying 
text.
156 The idea here is to disentangle judgment-proofing 
from the general debate
over the worth of the institution of secured 
credit generally. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text (summarizing fairness and efficiency 
questions raised by secured
credit). Judgment-proofing, nemo dat gone mad as we put 
it, is relocated for discrete
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ond, distillation and consignment of judgment-proofing to the nui-
sance domain supplies a manageable doctrinal response to this
practice and a remedial opportunity in more or less conventional
bankruptcy (arguably non-conventional state) law terms.'15 7 In short,
understanding judgment-proofing in terms of nuisance doctrine in ser-
vice of meaning introduces doctrinal demarcation and response man-
ageability through a simple heuristic structure. With that, we turn to
our explication of nuisance as a conceptual category.
There are doubtless a number of ways in which the conceptual
category "nuisance" might be explained and described.1 58 We believe,
however, that among them, nuisance might usefully be understood as
a radial category, just as we have suggested that the concept "prop-
erty" can be understood as a radial category.' 59 Moreover, an account
of nuisance as a radial category furnishes an explanatory perspective
that sheds an illuminating glint to highlight our purposes in this Part.
Specifically, it is our claim that judgment-proofing is likewise a con-
ceptually natural member of that radial category, and we propose
therefore the application of nuisance tenets in that context to enable
systematic decision response management.
A single prototype or best example of the conceptual category
nuisance is difficult to identify, but none is required. Any of a num-
ber would do. Our own informal inquiries suggest one serviceable
possibility, namely, the discharge of dust160 from one property for the
landowner's recreational use which travels to neighboring property
analysis on an abuse basis. Simply put, the injuries worked by judgment proofing are
reassembled under the few household terms from nuisance. The nature of those
threats is thus understood on conceptual grounds on which there is accord.
157 The strategy is to provide decision makers an accessible, off-the-rack means of
capturing and killing judgment-proofing schemes. Nuisance is long-standing and
conceptually seasoned, and its essential mission largely a matter of agreement. See
supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text. Nuisance doctrine is therefore readily
and widely available to decision makers.
158 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting that cognitive linguistics has
identified several conceptual category types).
159 Space does not permit a rigorous discussion of nuisance as a radial category,
but a detailed account is unnecessary for present purposes. The treatment of property
as radial category offered in Part II.B should serve to demonstrate how the analysis
proceeds.
160 While our choice of a central case is based upon our informal survey of our
colleagues, the factual instantiations in the cases are consistent with that choice and
offer a wide array of examples. The one we selected seemed to spring irresistibly to
the minds of most when asked to pick a best example. The other most common
responses elicited on asking for a common or most common nuisance were: barking
dogs, funeral homes, rank or obnoxious odors, smoke, and noise. Responses in-
cluded all, and they are easily elicited.
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and devalues it. The stories available in the case law suggest a host of
related radial members, and also the point at which extension fails.
They suggest as well some of the most salient features which define
the prototype.
Offending activity that produces substances short of dust or the
like is, within both the conceptual and legal categories, nuisance. For
instance, smoke is regarded as a nuisance-causing substance where it
crosses property lines to disturb neighbors or devalue their prop-
erty. 161 Considerable extension from the prototype is tolerated:
odors, noise, and light have all been ruled agents of nuisance. 6 2
Gases, odors, even noise and light, are not conceptually problem-
atic, or not seriously so-they are simply metaphoric extensions of
dust or other substances. But other activities have been declared a
nuisance within the legal category, though they produce nothing per-
ceptible, at the literal or nonliteral level that journeys to adjacent
property. For instance, an undertaking business is a nuisance-causing
activity, but produces nothing easily understood as crossing property
lines. 163 That radial extension is obviously acceptable, from which we
conclude sufficient resemblance to the category prototype.
The implication may be that resemblance to the best case in that
particular is essential neither for membership in the conceptual cate-
gory "nuisance" nor, for that matter, the conventional legal category.
It may also be that, assuming enough resemblance to the prototype on
other grounds, marginal resemblance by metaphoric extension will
do. We believe two features or traits seem to identify the central case:
first, the use of something one owns within sufficient proximity, liter-
ally or metaphorically, so as to injure something belonging to an-
other.164 Second, there is no good reason for the offending use; that
is, the good, if any, that is derived from the offending use is out-
weighed by the corresponding injury to neighboring interests. 165
161 See Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 100 S.E. 207, 210 (Ga. 1919) (stat-
ing that smoke constitutes a nuisance when it "produce[s] a visible, tangible, and
appreciable injury to property.").
162 Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (stating
that "[a]ll tangible intrusions, such as noise, odor, or light fall within the realm of
nuisance"); see also supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (differentiating nui-
sance from trespass in conceptual terms).
163 Howard v. Etchieson, 310 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ark. 1958).
164 The best example here may be pecuniary loss from visible, physical injury to
land. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 627.
165 The balance schema is widely distributed across any array of concepts. For an
account (and critique) of the balance schema in the law, where it becomes a special-
ized version of propositional reasoning, see JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 90-96.
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Turning to the relationship between certain uses 
of security and
the category prototype, the "use of property" (derived from 
the dust-
creating activity in the central case) is shared by the deployment 
of
security to judgment-proof at the literal level. In the case of 
the cate-
gory best example, the interest (land ownership) is sufficiently 
proxi-
mate (literally) to the place of the nuisance-creating 
conduct to be
devalued by that conduct. The proximity of 
the secured creditor's
unsecured creditor neighbors is easily established 
metaphorically. At
the nonliteral level, the community of unsecured 
creditors is within
injury-causing range of the security interest wielded to judgment-
proof the debtor.1 66 The presence of an interest 
susceptible to injury
is a feature shared at the literal level by the category 
prototype and the
unsecured creditor, as is the devaluation 
of the interest. 16
7
In the prototype we described for discussion purposes, 
the nui-
sance-causing conduct is recreational-it has 
value only to the party
undertaking it. The same is easily said of secured 
credit employed as a
judgment-proofing scheme-the correspondence is likely literal. 
It
would prove difficult, indeed, to find an argument 
claiming judg-
ment-proofing is of value to anyone save the 
secured party and, per-
haps, the debtor's current managers
. 68 With the aggregate utility of
secured credit generally still very much debated,
69 the use of secured
credit to judgment-proof at the expense of unsecured creditors 
seems
difficult to justify on any commercially rational, let alone equitable,
basis. Indeed, once the risk of firm failure has 
been entirely external-
ized, the incentives and controls that promote 
prudent business deci-
sion making are eschewed, and in their place 
is substituted a set of
stimuli and inducements that encourage decisions 
favoring the taking
166 The rights of unsecured creditors are within 
the sphere of influence, if you
will, of the secured claim. The unsecured creditors, 
it might be said, are the financial
neighbors of the secured creditor. The proximity 
is, of course, nonliteral.
167 See supra note 100 and accompanying text 
(pointing out that the rights ofjudg-
ment creditors are worthless where the debtor 
is judgment proof). The money judg-
ment, standing alone, might be described 
as little more than official
acknowledgement by the authority issuing it that 
the creditor's case for liability,
whether based on contract or tort, is made. That 
is not to say, on the other hand, that
a case might not be made for regarding in some 
sense the rights of unsecured credi-
tors as representing a property right, or at least 
a nascent property right. See infra text
accompanying notes 173-74.
168 LoPucki, supra note 11, at 14-30 (suggesting how the 
debtor may benefit from
judgment-proofing schemes); see also supra notes 101-02 and 
accompanying text (dis-
cussing judgment-proofing strategies).
169 See supra notes 7-8.
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of risk wholly disproportionate to any reasonable assessment 
of poten-
tial return.
170
If we hypothesize a borrower that, because of the nature 
of its
current and historic business operations, faces a serious 
risk of insol-
vency due to, for example, contingent and unliquidated 
tort liability
(e.g., a tobacco company), one sees the beginnings of an argument
that the system of prioritization in favor of the firm's 
secured lenders
might operate as an unreasonable interference (i.e. a nuisance-caus-
ing event) with the property rights of its unsecured creditors 
who have
no real or practical opportunity to bargain for the 
same advantage.
When this occurs, some limitation of full priority, 
or perhaps another
other remedy, such as alter ego liability to pull more assets 
into reach,
may be called for under suppletory doctrines such 
as the notion of
enterprise liability in the case of artificially fractured 
corporate struc-
tures1 71 or fraudulent transfer law where the leveraging 
through se-
cured financing has left the firm with 
unreasonably small capital)
72
We take this question up in Part V below, but, first, 
a threshold inquiry
needs to be addressed: namely, are "property" interests 
being invaded
at all when the nature of the prejudiced claims is purely contractual 
in
nature?
We believe the answer is clearly "yes," justified on one of two ba-
ses. First, while perhaps purely nascent in form, 
the right of un-
secured creditors to reduce their claims to judgment and secure 
or
satisfy those judgments through execution on the debtor's property 
is
intrinsically and notionally no less a "property" right 
than the secured
creditor's claim to future property, which is and 
always has been
clearly recognized in Article 9.173 Second, were 
the same rights as-
signed to secured creditors they would most certainly 
be classified as
personal property collateral within the scope of Article 
9. Indeed, Ar-
ticle 9 is itself largely an exercise in the classification 
of things, the
most basic of which is the first inquiry undertaken 
to determine
whether the collateral is real estate. If not, and 
not otherwise ex-
cluded, the property, and the taking of an interest 
in the property, is
subject to Article 9.174 Stated another way, if the rights of such 
credi-
tors were hypothecated, the drafters had no qualms 
about including
170 See infta notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
171 See, e.g., Katherine D. Kale, Securitizing 
the Enterprise: Enterprise Liability and
Transferred Receivables in Bankruptcy, 20 BANR. DEy. J. 311, 
314 (2003) (discussing "the
possibility of imposing enterprise liability through 
agency principles in order to draw
transferred receivables back into the estate 
of the bankrupt parent corporation").
172 See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
173 U.C.C. § 9-204 (2006).
174 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying 
text.
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them in the taxonomy of personalty and declaring the interest con-
veyed an Article 9 security interest. Logically, if such rights can be
regarded as property after they are hypothecated, then surely they
must also be so before the interest actually arises.
The predicate for designating a judgment-proofing scheme as a
species of the conceptual category nuisance derives from Grant Gil-
more's original observation that security was never designed to permit
borrowers to hypothecate "all that they may ever own in the indefinite
future" to a creditor willing to make a loan that, in light of the risks
entailed, should probably never have been made in the first place. 175
Stated another way, there must be some limiting considerations on
the ability of debtors to overleverage simply because creditors can
overcollateralize. 176 Moreover, the fallout (and bankruptcy bailouts)
witnessed in the wake of the leverage buyout exuberance of the late
1980s is a telling reminder that we cannot count on the discipline of
the market alone to control such excesses. 1 77 Indeed, had the princi-
pals in those transactions known that they might have to bear the risks
and costs associated with their highly speculative investment decisions,
175 1 GILMORE, supra note 4, §7.12, at 248-49. This observation also formed the
basis for the Warren carve-out proposal. See Warren, supra note 16, at 324 (citing
Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confes-
sions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 627 (1981)).
176 Warren, supra note 16, at 323-34. A more elegant solution, if for no other
reason than that it would have constrained the misuse of secured credit within the
four corners of Article 9 itself, the carve-out proposal went nowhere with the Revised
Article 9 Drafting Committee because of the committee's blind allegiance to the
property/conveyance model of security. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying
text. The assignment of security to the category "property," understanding that cate-
gory in a conventional rather than a radial or other metaphoric sense, might be la-
mented, but it cannot be ignored. Our proposal differs then from the carve-out
proposal less in substance and more in approach, as we suggest a rubric for taming
the worst abuses of security within the contours of the prevailing property model.
177 See generally Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasona-
ble Risk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1180 (1995) (discussing the "inherently risky" nature of
leveraged buyouts). In this classic analysis of the application of fraudulent transfer
law to LBO transactions, Professor Zaretsky pointed out that an LBO lender would
often receive collateral as well as a high interest rate and substantial fees. Id. at 1192.
The risk that this senior collateralized lender would not be repaid was, thus, relatively
small, while the potential profits loomed large. This created an incentive to pursue a
transaction even if there was a relatively high risk of failure. At the same time, how-
ever, from the perspective of non LBO creditors, who before the transaction stood to
be repaid in full, the loss upon failure of the enterprise was likely to be substantial
without the corresponding potential reward in the event of success. The act of judg-
ment-proofing a debtor through the issuance of secured debt produces precisely the
same risk/reward premium for the secured lender and risk/reward penalty for un-
secured lenders. Id.
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it is unlikely that the credit that fueled many of those transactions
would have been available in the first place.
It is our contention that when full priority rules result in a trans-
fer of value from unsecured creditors to secured creditors, which in
itself we suppose is neither good nor bad, enforcement of these rules
warrant greater scrutiny. Specifically, when this result occurs in any
given situation, the appropriate inquiry is not only whether the phe-
nomenon is theoretically defensible in terms of net social savings or
utility, but also whether it is defensible in the context of fairness inter
se among the parties involved in the transactional dynamics in which
it occurs. It is in this regard that we have suggested that it is not de-
fensible when the all-encompassing security interest has been em-
ployed by corporate managers of a distressed entity to leverage the
debtor firm to levels that exceed the liquidation value of the firm and,
thereby, allow management and the principal financer to ignore the
reasonable risks of business failure.
Invariably, this occurs when all of the debtor's available assets
have been hypothecated as collateral; that is, security becomes not
simply-as intended-a vehicle to assure repayment of a debt, but
rather a mechanism for shifting the entire risk of firm collapse to un-
secured creditors. In other words, when security becomes a license to
gamble with "other people's money,"1 78 the form has been used to
perpetrate a wrong that cries for a remedy, or, to call into service the
property-based concepts we discussed earlier, the perverse incentives
facilitated by full credit prioritization have become a nuisance. 179
Moreover, when the debtor, or debtor's management, has lost any
raison d'etre to seek the long-term interests of the firm by taking ap-
propriate steps to operate with both reasonable care and ordinary bus-
178 By "other people's money," we mean specifically, the services and supplies pro-
vided by general unsecured creditors and the value to which tort victims would other-
wise have been entitled in compensation for their injuries. See Shavell, supra note
102, at 45 ("An injurer will treat liability that exceeds his assets as imposing an effec-
tive financial penalty only equal to his assets; an injurer with assets of $30,000, for
example, will treat an accident resulting in liability of $100 000 identically with an
accident resulting in liability of only $30 000.").
179 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 147, at 602-03 (advocating that nuisance
theory should be recast and expanded from one that focuses on interference with
use and enjoyment" to one that regulates directly against uses of property that impair
the value of adjacent property owners). This approach to nuisance is even more di-
rectly apposite to our argument inasmuch as secured claims by definition appropriate
value from unsecured claims. While we do not assert that this a basis for interference
with the Article 9 priority rules in every case, we could maintain that it becomes so
when the effect is to appropriate all value and, in so doing, leave unsecured creditors
exposed to unreasonable risks that would not otherwise exist.
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iness prudence,1 8 0 and the secured creditor has 
no incentive to
constrain these tendencies,
181 arguments based on the supposed effi-
ciency of secured credit become rather feeble and 
attenuated.
The 1998 amendments to Article 9 which eliminated 
virtually all
exclusions of the types of personal property in which 
a valid security
interest can be granted, and married that expansion 
in scope with a
very successful undertaking to make the taking of 
security "as easy,
inexpensive, and reliable as possible,"
18 2 have exacerbated the likeli-
hood that judgment-proofing behavior will occur. If the company,
succumbing to the temptations created by that condition, 
then fails
because the "gamble" doesn't pay off, two consequences 
follow: (1)
the debtor likely will lack the liquidity necessary 
to effectuate a suc-
cessful reorganization, and (2) on liquidation, or even in the rare 
case
where the debtor is able to emerge from Chapter 
11, the secured debt
will exceed the value of the collateral, thereby effectively 
eliminating
all liability except to the secured creditor, whose claim 
will be equal to
or exceed the value of the reorganized debtor or its remaining 
assets,
as the case may be.
In our view, the use of secured credit to judgment-proof the
debtor is a striking example of the radial category 
nuisance. The re-
semblance to the prototype through shared features 
on what we re-
gard to be natural extension is instantly recognizable
-I83 To put it
bluntly, the use of security to judgment-proof injures the community
of one's unsecured neighbors and benefits no 
one but the secured
party' 84-it stinks of nuisance. Our thesis, then, 
is that the security
interest either becomes a nuisance, or at least merits 
greater scrutiny
as potentially constituting a nuisance, when the 
debtor has encum-
180 See generally Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond 
Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for
the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 513 (1993) (discussing the 
differing interests and
motivatations of shareholders and non-shareholder 
managers of public companies
from the perspective of the long-term economic 
best interest of the firm).
181 See Note, supra note 107, at 2254-55 (explaining that 
secured creditors lose
the incentive to monitor anything other than the 
value of their collateral, including
managerial decisions regarding investments and risk, 
when they do not bear the costs
of those risks).
182 Carl S. Bjerre, International Project Finance Transactions: Selected 
Issues Under Re-
vised Article 9, 73 Am. BANv.,R. L.J. 261, 307 n.21
9 (1999) (quoting Harris & Mooney,
supra note 2, at 2021 (1994)).
183 See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
184 Bear in mind that the supposed "benefit" to 
the secured creditor is also some-
what ephemeral if the blanket lien on all assets is 
substituted for an informed credit
decision. See Note, supra note 107, at 2555. Indeed, 
all creditors, including secured
creditors, are better off if the firm takes appropriate 
precautions to manage the rea-
sonable risks of conducting its business.
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bered all or most of its assets with no provision, such as insurance, for
internalizing the reasonably foreseeable risks of its operations. Identi-
fication of these circumstances post hoc is a relatively easy matter com-
pared to identification ex ante, but this is a task in which courts
routinely engage; for example, in application of fraudulent transfer
law-both in and out of a bankruptcy situation.185
Theoretically, of course, the incurring of secured debt should
never alone cause this circumstance to occur, unless the amount of
the actual debt secured is artificially inflated to deliberately mislead
unsecured creditors, inasmuch as the assets encumbered are simply
traded for the proceeds of the secured loan. That is, the balance
sheet is altered in composition but overall net worth is unaffected. 86
But where the debtor is financially unstable and at risk of investing the
loan proceeds ill advisedly, a situation more likely to be present in all-
asset financing cases simply because the secured lender had the lever-
age to negotiate such draconian terms as a condition of the credit in
the first place,1 87 the externalization of risk to all but the secured
lender is inevitable. Indeed, both the Bankruptcy Code and the Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Law recognize as a constructively fraudu-
lent transfer one that leaves the debtor with unreasonably small
185 See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
186 This argument has also been raised in response to criticisms of securitizations
and other forms of structured financing transactions as judgment-proofing schema,
namely, that in these deals, assets of one kind are simply exchanged for assets of
another kind in an arm's-length transaction. That is to say, the originator will receive
proceeds equal in value to the assets sold, thus not diminishing the value of the origi-
nator's estate. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 12-16 (arguing that only if the
originator disposes of the proceeds is there judgment-proofing; securitization in and
of itself is not a judgment-proofing technique). One response to Schwarcz's argu-
ment is that securitization, while not itself sufficient to judgment-proof a firm, is a
useful component of a judgment-proofing technique: first securitize, then distribute
the proceeds to claimants. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic ofJudgment Proof-
ing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55, 59 (1999). The same logic applies
in the case of secured loans. See infra note 187.
187 In the case of larger companies, where there is a separation of ownership and
management, agency issues further elevate the risk of imprudent use of the funds
because of management's personal incentive to make high payoff, but high risk, in-
vestments that may not be in the long-term best interests of the company. See supra
note 108 and accompanying text. This is particularly so if the borrower firm was ex-
periencing financial difficulties to begin with, which, in turn, is precisely the kind of
situation in which secured lenders will have the motivation and the leverage to effec-
tively encumber all the debtor owns.
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capital in relation to actual or anticipated business activities in which
the debtor is currently engaged or plans to engage. 188
Of course, to sustain the fraudulent transfer analogy, the assets
remaining after the security transfer must not only be unreasonably
small, but what was returned to the debtor in exchange for the secur-
ity interest must be of less than reasonable economic equivalence. 18 9
This can be difficult to establish under a pure fraudulent transfer
analysis, as evidenced by cases willing to indulge the fiction of equiva-
lence even in the situation where the value goes to a third party, such
as redeemed shareholders or a seller-corporation in the leveraged
buyout scenario. 9
It is at this juncture that we believe the nuisance analysis has a
great deal to offer in providing a counterweight to the opportunities
for mischief created by Revised Article 9's vast expansion of and defer-
ence to secured credit. This is not to suggest by any stretch of the
imagination that every extension of secured debt is nefarious, or even
that the value judgments made by the drafters relative to the correla-
tion between the good of the economy and the relaxing of most re-
straints on secured financing were wrong. It is only to recognize that,
at the same time, the confluence of limited liability and the expansion
of secured debt has created the potential for abuse which, under the
current doctrinal scheme, has no natural predator-a bad thing no
less in the world of finance than in nature.
Affordable credit, the shibboleth constantly trotted out in de-
fense of full priority, if a good thing to a point, is also not a "holy
grail" to be pursued oblivious to collateral damage. The possibility
that, if abused, the privileges normally associated with the taking of
security may be withdrawn through application of the nuisance model
creates a powerful incentive for secured lenders to make more ra-
tional credit decisions then they have reason to make under the cur-
188 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(11) (2000); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
§ 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 301 (1999). Unlike "insolvency," "unreasonably small capital"
is not defined by the UNW. FRAUDLENT CONVEYANCES Aar §§ 2, 5, 7A U.L.A. 22-23,
105 (1999). This has engendered confusion over the relationship between these con-
cepts: some courts have equated a finding of equitable insolvency (inability to pay
debts as they come due) with that of unreasonably small capital. See, e.g., MFS/Sun
Life Trust-High Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co., 910 F. Supp. 913, 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). The better view, however, is that unreasonably small capital denotes
a financial condition short of equitable insolvency. See Bruce A. Markell, Toward True
and Plain Dealing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital,
21 IND. L. REv. 469, 498 (1988).
189 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
190 See, e.g., In re R.M.L., Inc., 92 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 1996); Mellon Bank, N.A
v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 646-48 (3d Cir. 1991).
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rent regime. And if that does increase the cost 
of credit in certain
cases, then, again, we would submit that this cost 
is a fairer reflection
of the internal risk of the transaction.
In short, the ascendancy of the property-based account 
of security
does not mean, or have to mean, that secured claims 
will always trump
their unsecured counterparts. What we have tried 
in summary fashion
to illustrate is that by approaching the categorization 
of security as
property in metaphoric rather than conventional 
terms, while still re-
maining true to the core conceptual analogy (i.e., property), 
Article 9
can be reconciled dynamically with the other legal 
systems and princi-
ples from which it cannot operate in isolation. 
These include, among
others, property-based systems and principles 
designed to reconcile
cross-boundary conflicts and, in this context, 
to promote distribu-
tional fairness.
V. REMEDY
If the security interest is determined to be a 
nuisance-an abuse
of purposive intent and form-what is the appropriate 
remedial re-
sponse? The answer, we believe, already exists 
in the academic litera-
ture, and that is subordination to some extent 
of the secured party's
legal entitlement to full priority.
91 Certainly we do not contend that
every case where the debtor's assets are or become 
insufficient to sat-
isfy the totality of claims against the debtor is 
an appropriate case for
loss of full priority. But when the debtor's assets 
are or become so
inadequate as not to cover any claims save that of the 
secured lender,
the predicate for examining a re-ordering of 
legal priorities becomes
far more compelling.
The largely academic debate over full versus 
partial priority
largely occurred in the years and months leading 
up to the revision of
Article 9;192 and, in light of the provisions of the 
final approved, and
now universally-adopted, version of the statute 
might seem a dead let-
191 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 8, at 
905-06 (proposing subordination in
bankruptcy of full priority in the case of nonconsensual 
creditors and other weekly
adjusting or nonadjusting creditors); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk 
& Jesse M. Fried,
The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: 
Further Thoughts and a
Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1279, 1286-88 
(1997) (arguing that full priority is
inconsistent with the requirement of explicit 
consent to subordination); supra note
106 (arguing that full priority to secured claims encourages 
firms to engage in riskier
behavior than optimal because they do not internalize 
the cost of these risks). Other
remedial responses to judgment-proofing accomplished through 
securitization have
also been proposed. See authorities cited supra 
note 103.
192 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. 
Fried, A New Apporach to Valuing Se-
cured Claims in Bankrputcy, 114 RARV. L. REV. 2386 
(2001); Warren, supra note 27.
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ter. t 93 This is of course another artifact of the triumph of the "secur-
ity interest as property" model, but it only needs be so if one takes a
formalistic view of the statute rather than one that harmonizes its posi-
tive law provisions with its purposive objectives and applicable non-
Code doctrine.
It is our contention, for the reasons previously stated, that the
deliberate, or even improvident, judgment-proofing of the debtor by
means of incurring secured debt in excess of the liquidation value of
the firm's assets sets forth an example of when it may be appropriate
to conceptualize the secured creditor's property interest as a nui-
sance. In turn, this should allow-wholly within the framework of the
property metaphor that has come to dominate how security is under-
stood-for some limitation on the secured creditor's rights in relation
to the parties victimized by the nuisance; i.e., unsecured creditors at
whose expense the scheme was hatched. But what is the legal basis for
reordering priority? Surely, it is not found in the four corners of Arti-
cle 9 itself, which has unconditionally embraced full priority. Moreo-
ver, because of the bankruptcy law's recognition and enforcement of
the state law rights and interests that creditors bring with them into a
federal bankruptcy proceeding, full priority of secured credit has be-
come a basic principle of bankruptcy as well. Although one could
question fairly whether the imaginative associations entailed in the
understanding of a security interest that pervade under state law nec-
essarily have to and should endure in the context of a collectivized
proceeding,1 94 a more practical answer already exists. That answer be-
gins with the Bankruptcy Code itself, which codifies the bankruptcy
courts' inherent statutory authority to invoke their equitable powers
to subordinate for distribution purposes all or any part of an allowed
claim.t 9 5
As it has been interpreted by the courts, harking back to its ori-
gins in the Supreme Court's opinion in Pepper v. Litton, 9 6 the doc-
193 See Warren, supra note 16, at 325; see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying
text (proposing a revision of Article 9 that would effectuate the set-aside proposal).
194 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 8, at 2289-96 (urging adoption of a
value-based conceptualization of secured claims in bankruptcy as an alternative to the
property-based account that pervades under state law based on a normative view of
bankruptcy policy that recognizes the interests of noncreditor constituencies).
195 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2000). The purpose of the doctrine is to allow bankruptcy
courts "to reprioritize the order of allowed claims based on the equities of the case,
rather than to allow or disallow the claim in the first instance." Rafael lgnacio Pardo,
Note, Beyond the Limits of Equity Jurisprudence: No-Fault Equitable Subordination, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2000) (quoting In re County of Orange, 219 B.R. 543, 559 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1997)).
196 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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trine of equitable subordination has generally, but not always, been
predicated on some form of "creditor misconduct."' 97 In this sense,
equitable subordination has been understood to differ from fraudu-
lent transfer analysis, the latter having at its core a focus on the
debtor's conduct (or misconduct, as the case may be). However, on
two occasions in 1996, the Supreme Court of the United States, while
rejecting any categorical subordination of claims in favor of a case-by-
case approach, declined to overrule several circuit court decisions ap-
plying a no-fault standard on a case-by-case basis. 198 In effect, the
Court left intact at least three circuit court decisions ordering equita-
ble subordination in the absence of creditor misconduct in order to
protect innocent creditors from misconduct by the debtor.199 Thus,
arguably, statutory authority for remediating a nuisance by adjusting
the priority of claims in bankruptcy is already extant. The willingness
of courts to do so, however, and the appropriateness of such action in
the face of the general bias in bankruptcy to enforce state law entitle-
ments and enforce statutory priorities, would be open to serious ques-
tion in the absence of an analogous form of relief under applicable
non bankruptcy law, which has been thought not to exist. That as-
sumption, however, has now been cast into considerable doubt.
In an intriguing article, Professor David Gray Carlson has sug-
gested a basis for eschewing the metaphors that have dominated
fraudulent transfer law and equitable subordination, and in their
place substituting a way of thinking about these areas of law that not
only more accurately captures their underlying policy aims and practi-
cal implications, but that also recognizes an inherent kinship between
the two doctrines. 200 Specifically, Carlson observes that the meta-
phoric concepts that have traditionally come to structure these doc-
trines in commercial discourse-"avoidance" in the case of fraudulent
transfers and "demotion" with respect to equitable subordination-
are the wrong concepts because, while they may produce serendip-
197 The case most frequently cited for this proposition is Benjamin v. Diamond (In
re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977).
198 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 228-29
(1996); United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 543 (1996).
199 Burden v. United States (In re Burden), 917 F.2d 115, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1990);
Schultz Broadway Inn v. United States, 912 F.2d 230, 233-34 (8th Cir. 1990); In re
Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1990).
200 David G. Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable Subor-
dination, 45 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 157 (2003).
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itously the "right" result in many cases, they fail to produce the de-
sired result in marginal but no less important cases. 20'
Professor Carlson's analysis shows that, in each instance, the rem-
edy is actually the same; namely, expropriation and transfer of specific
property rights.202 By replacing the concepts of "avoidance" and "sub-
ordination" with the single notion of transfer, Carlson convincingly
demonstrates that commercial discourse is brought into "closer iden-
tity with its actual logical structure."2 3 Under this approach, two
seemingly inconsistent remedies, invoked in response to different mis-
deeds, are harmonized by the recognition that in either case what ac-
tually occurs is an assignment of one creditor's claim to those harmed
by the inequitable conduct.
The intuition that what actually transpires, whether the miscon-
duct is challenged under the fraudulent transfer law or the doctrine
of equitable subordination, is transfer of specific property rights, ex-
poses an even more important insight for present purposes. That is,
although ordinarily understood as a uniquely federal remedy, Carl-
son's research and analysis reveals that "equitable subordination is
simply the fraudulent transfer remedy in disguise and that both reme-
dies can be considered to be within the competence of state law to
achieve." 20 4 In other words, equitable subordination, if essentially the
fraudulent transfer law as applied in the context of a collective pro-
ceeding, must (despite frequent disavowal120) exist as part of the gen-
eral common law of the states, and Carlson makes a compelling case
that it does. 20 6
201 Id. at 164-65 (noting that in the "average" case, the proper characterization of
the remedy makes no practical difference, but that the concept of "avoidance" incor-
rectly implies a return of value to the debtor in the rare fraudulent transfer case
where a surplus exists, and "demotion" fails to adequately explain what transpires
when subordination is to some but not all creditors).
202 Id. at 165 ("What is really going on in all cases is a transfer of specific property
rights.").
203 Id. at 162.
204 Id. at 164.
205 See id. at 163 n.17 (citing 9281 Shore Rd. Owners Corp. v. Seminole Realty Co.
(In re 9281 Shore Rd. Owners Corp.), 187 B.R. 837, 852-54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995);
Greenfield v. Shuck, 867 F. Supp. 62, 70 (D. Mass. 1994); In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 163
B.R. 411, 413 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In re Poughkeepsie Hotel Assocs. joint Venture,
132 B.R. 287, 292 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); Primex Plastics Corp. v. Lawrence Prods.,
Inc. No. 89 Civ. 2994 JSM), 1991 WL 183367, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1991)).
206 Carlson, supra note 200, at 218-19 (pointing to examples from New York and
other states). Under Carlson's analysis, equitable subordination essentially works as
an assignment of the claim of one creditor to the creditors harmed by the first credi-
tor's conduct. Id. at 200. So understood, it is functionally and analytically distinct
from what occurs when a transfer is set aside or avoided as fraudulent.
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The implications of this insight for remedying a nuisance-creat-
ing security interest are obvious. It affirms that courts, both in a bank-
ruptcy context and out, faced with a security transfer that abuses the
form, have the power and authority to transfer back the value improp-
erly misappropriated from unsecured creditors by adjusting relative
priorities. Moreover, this can be legitimately accomplished without
disturbing the prevailing conceptualization of the security interest as
property since, by definition, the transfer that is contemplated by the
remedy is fundamentally a transfer recognized on long-standing prop-
erty concepts and doctrine. Historically, of course, the related princi-
ples of security of property and nemo dat-the debtor's ability to
convey that which it owns and the rule of derivative title 2 0 7 -have al-
ways been limited by the law of fraudulent transfer which effectively
proscribes certain property transfers perceived to prejudice unduly in-
nocent creditors.20 8 The effect of finding a particular transfer to fall
within the categorical parameters of a fraudulent transfer is to require
that the transferee return back that which was conveyed for the bene-
fit of the debtor's other creditors. All we are suggesting is that such a
"transfer" can also be accomplished, when the misconduct consists of
judgment-proofing through use of secured debt by ordering the
whole or partial subordination of priority-thereby, resulting in, ef-
fectively, an abatement of the nuisance.
The reordering of priorities in this manner in circumstances
when all available assets have been conveyed to secure financing is not
simply a mechanism to redress managerial excess or creditor miscon-
duct in specific instances where it occurs. The recognition of such a
nuisance-like remedy should also, we believe, have a salutary in ter-
rorer effect in terms of promoting more control and discipline over
excessive risk taking. In other words, if the combination of full prior-
ity and the corresponding bankruptcy rules which implement that
principle fails to deter and even encourages judgment-proofing
schema by facilitating the externalization of firm failure, then the ad-
justment of those legal rules to ensure that all creditors share in the
risk of nonpayment should promote overall social utility.20 9
207 See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 550 (1872) ("No one in general
can sell personal property and convey valid title to it unless he is the owner.... Nemo
dat quod non habet.").
208 See, e.g., Sturtevant & Keep v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812)
("The law, in every period of its history has spoken a uniform language, and has al-
ways looked with great jealousy upon a sale or appropriation of goods, without parting
with the possession, because it forms so easy and so fruitful a source of deception.").
209 See Warren, supra note 27, at 1388 ("The ultimate question is not whether a
partial priority scheme might cause some constriction in lending .... The real ques-
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Stated another way, abatement of the "nuisance" created by the
only parties at the bargaining table-the debtor and the particular
creditor advantaged by the scheme-by requiring the transfer back
for unsecured creditors of some portion of that value upon firm fail-
ure would certainly result in a more equitable sharing of the loss in
that case. Beyond that, however, it would also assist in ensuring that
that future credit decisions appropriately factor into the analysis a re-
alistic and prudent assessment of the debtor's financial prospects and
the likelihood of insolvency. Furthermore, it would create rational
incentives, even after the initial extension of value, for secured credi-
tors to monitor and thwart managerial decisions that eschew conven-
tional risk calculations in pursuit of short-term but low probability
riches.210 In sum, if more credit is available, or available at a lower
cost, simply because the providers of that credit have no motivation or
reason to factor the true cost of credit into the lending decision, then
it is far from clear to us that this is something the commercial law
should embrace. Thus, the conventional arguments against diluting
Article 9's full priority regime collapse under the weight of their own
internal illogic, and the road is cleared to fashion a remedy suited to
redress the "security interest as a nuisance" phenomenon as and when
it occurs.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of equity or equity-like notions into the Article
9 priority scheme has been questioned as potentially undermining
commercial certainty and efficiency.2 11 But, in the absence of mallea-
ble equitable controls, what are the constraints on secured credit?
Thanks to the conceptual monopoly owned by Article 9, most espe-
cially in its revised version, the security interest is property for all ends,
assuring the secured creditor property priority on a field of play where
other claimants hold no interest dignified by that label. What is more,
unlike other property interests, the security interest has come to oc-
cupy the elevated but questionable status of property endowed with
immunity from conventional property misuse or abuse controls, most
notably for our purposes, the nuisance doctrine.2 12 We challenge that
tion is how the efficiency arguments, even if they were unambiguously true, stack up
against other considerations [such as community sensibilities and fairness].").
210 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text for discussion of the perverse
incentives created by the property-based account of security.
211 SeejAMEsj. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-19
(4th ed. 1995) (entitled, "Weird Cases: The Creeping Infestation of Article 9 Priority
Rules by 'Principles of Law and Equity' and other Cases on the Fringe of Title 9").
212 See supra Part Ill,
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immunity as irrational on the grounds of distributive inequity, as well
as the systemic adverse impact it creates in the form of perverse incen-
tives simultaneously bearing on lender-imposed discipline and mana-
gerial accountability2 3
It is, we would contend, unreasonable, not to mention illogical, to
maintain that the property regime that attends Article 9 should par-
take of some but not all of the principles of the conveyancing model
that apply with respect to other forms of property transactions. Thus,
assuming a security interest is understood metaphorically to convey an
interest in property, ownership of that interest, like any other prop-
erty interest, does not carry with it the absolute and unfettered right
to interfere with the legitimate interests of others. Borrowing from
the source concept that has, for better or worse, dominated the Arti-
cle 9 revision process-namely, property law doctrine and analysis-it
is our position that when the debtor has through security allowed or
conspired (which is really of no moment) with creditors to permit
management to ignore the normal risk calculations associated with
investment decisions by shifting that risk to potential tort victims,
small trade creditors, and arguably even current equity,21 4 some limi-
tation on the normal rules of prioritization are appropriate to abate
the nuisance. The remedial underpinnings that form the basis for
such limitations are analogically already extant in the prevailing doc-
trines of fraudulent transfer law and equitable subordination, prop-
erly understood. When implicated, those concepts, which Article 9
cannot rationally exist independent of or immune from, are remedied
through transfer back of the misappropriated assets, in this context
transfer back of all or some of the priority interest through
subordination.
But if secured creditors are compelled by the possibility of a sub-
sequent reordering of priority to factor now a risk premium into the
cost of lending, will not the inevitable effect be to raise the cost of
credit or limit the availability of credit to suboptimal levels? This, of
213 The point is not theoretical-the impact of these incentives is real, measura-
ble, and, it would appear, growing. See LoPucki, supra note 11, at 17-18 (describing
the effects of cheap and easy secured credit on distribution to unsecured creditors in
bankruptcy). The risk is particularly acute in the case of firms operating on the preci-
pice of insolvency where secured lenders, knowing they are protected up to the value
of their collateral, are less inclined to monitor and control unduly risky investment
decisions, and managers, with nothing to lose, are encouraged to engage in just such
activities. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
214 Most literature focuses on tort victims. See supra note 107. We do not. While
tort claimants are the most sympathetic casualties of judgment proofing, they are, by
far, not the only ones who suffer at the hands of a bankruptcy system that, for the
most part, enforces state law priority rules.
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course, is the traditional efficiency-based apology 
in favor of an un-
compromisingly strict full priority regime. 
What we (and before us,
others) -2 1 5 have attempted to show is that argument 
begs the question
because it is predicated on an unstated, but 
highly dubious, assump-
tion that more credit is always preferable to 
less. From that premise, it
naturally follows that the lower the cost 
of credit the better as well,
since this in turn ensures an abundance of 
credit. Without desiring to
rehash the by now hackneyed efficiency 
debate,2 1 6 the more honest
proponents of full priority do not contest 
that this rule promotes the
externalization of cost, but rather maintain 
that those costs are justi-
fied by the corresponding benefits of secured credit 
and, accordingly,
are optimal. That proposition, however, 
has yet to be proved. In the
meantime, the point at present is simply 
that any rule that permits
lenders to ignore all of the reasonably foreseeable 
costs of doing busi-
ness cannot be defended simply on the basis 
that this lowers the cost
of credit.
Currently, through the conveyance model, 
the Article 9 security
interest partakes only of the advantages associated 
with the legal cate-
gory "property." It does not partake of 
property limitations and re-
sponsibilities that apply with respect to 
at least some other forms of
property transactions. It certainly is not subject to any 
limitations on
use. These conditions strike us as the perfect 
formula for the abuse of
secured credit in the form of judgment-proofing, the 
perfect formula
for creating a nuisance.
In the end, our proposal to rectify that situation 
is, again, a rela-
tively modest one. The nuisance doctrine 
to regulate unreasonable
uses of property, and the remedial doctrine, equitable 
subordination,
are already in place. The nuisance concept 
offers a manageable set of
standards by which abuse of secured credit 
may be identified and
given a familiar name, and its deleterious 
effects may be uprooted
through the adjustment of priority.
215 Several subordination proponents have 
argued that affording full priority for
security interests in bankruptcy leads to suboptimal, 
inefficient precautions against
risk. See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 82, at 1584 
(concluding limited liability permits
corporations to externalize risk, with the result 
that corporations engage in behavior
that is inefficient); Warren, supra note 27, at 1387-88 ("The 
incursions on priority in
tax law, in statutory liens, and in bankruptcy, make 
clear that fostering as much lend-
ing as possible is not the only goal of any commercial 
law system. The goal is always
one of balance."); see also Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Contracting
Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARv. L. 
REV. 1197, 1216-17 (2005)
(critiquing contractualist theories of bankruptcy law as 
creating the risk of the same
sorts of losses from maladjustment of claims as those that 
exist in a full priority se-
cured credit regime from the presence of maladjusting unsecured 
creditors).
216 See supra note 7.
